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ABSTRACT 
The general macroeconomic and political difficulties experienced by many Sub-
Saharan African countries in the late 1980s has led to economic and political reforms to 
improve private investment performance. It has been estimated that Sub-Saharan African 
countries needed to boost private investment in gross domestic product some 25% in the 
1990s to achieve sustainable growth and development (Pfefferman and Madarassy, 
1989). However, private investment performance has fallen short of the estimated 25%, 
and remained stagnant between 12.4% and 14.1% per annum from 1993 to 2002. 
The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the influence of macroeconomic 
factors and democracy, proxied by political rights and civil liberties scores, on gross 
private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1993 to 2002. The study uses the 
neoclassical investment model which suggests that output, the real interest rate, the price 
of capital, the rate of depreciation of capital, and public sector investment are the main 
determinants of private investment. Also, the study examines the effects of other 
variables such as the per capita income, the credit availability to the private sector, the 
general price level, the external shock, the currency depreciation or devaluation, and the 
debt overhang, on private investment. The study utilizes panel data from 1993 to 2002 for 
43 Sub-Saharan African countries and employs the panel least squares, the fixed effects 
and the random effects techniques to estimate the model. Following the Hausman test 
statistics, the study placed more weight on the fixed effects model and found that the 
growth rate of real output, the per capita income, and the past level of private investment 
are the significant factors affecting private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy 
exerts the expected positive impact albeit insignificantly. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The public sector, in the form of local, state, and federal or national governmental 
offices, organizations, and institutions, performs very important functions. Although the 
proper role of the government in economic development is subject to considerable 
debate, public sector economic literature suggests that government should provide public 
goods, correct for externalities induced by market transactions, and promote competition. 
In addition, government has a responsibility to stabilize the economy through the use of 
fiscal and monetary policies to control unemployment and inflation that may result from 
aggregate failure of the market. Most importantly, government also has the responsibility 
to redistribute income to reduce unequal distribution of income by market forces. 
However, in recent times, due to budgetary constraints and efficiency considerations, 
governments over the world have resorted to privatization and public-private partnerships 
arrangements to deliver public goods and services. This shift in emphasis from the public 
sector to the private sector demands increases in private sector investment in order to 
cope with the challenges of economic development and growth. 
The role of total domestic investment in promoting economic development in 
post-independent Sub-Saharan Africa had been recognized by development planners. But 
there had been considerable debate and disagreement as to whether the public or the 
private sector should provide the leading role in promoting investment. In the presence of 
massive poverty and colossal market failures, many Sub-Saharan African countries opted 
for centralized development planning in which the state or the public sector assumed the 
commanding role in investment initiatives. Besides market failures and poverty, Sub-
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Saharan African countries were heavily influenced by the examples of the former Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and India that industrialized at a fast pace with 
centralized planning (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Hope, 1997; 1999). Sub-Saharan 
African countries not only adopted the Soviet Union's style of economic development but 
also its political governance model of one party or no party regimes without tolerance for 
political dissent and the suppression of political freedoms and civil liberties. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, due mainly to economic stagnation 
and poor governance outcomes, there had been a re-thinking and re-conceptualization of 
economic development policy and political governance in Sub- Saharan Africa. As a 
result, many Sub-Saharan Africa countries implemented structural adjustment policies 
and democratic constitutional reforms in which the private sector was recognized as the 
main engine of growth. This study therefore examines the macroeconomic and political 
factors affecting private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1993 to 2002 within the 
context of neoclassical investment theory and the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. 
This chapter presents the background, the statement of the problem, the purpose 
of the study, the theoretical framework, the methodology, the significance of the study, 
and its limitations. 
Background 
Development strategy in many post-independent Sub-Saharan African countries 
in the early 1960s was shaped by centralized economic planning systems, various forms 
of socialist organizations and emphasis on Keynesian economics. Also, there were 
government administered price controls and regulated labor, commodity, and financial 
markets. Again, the share of the public sector in the economy was increased through the 
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appropriation and nationalization of private enterprises and financial institutions, and the 
creation of public monopolies responsible for the marketing of agriculture products. 
Furthermore, governments administratively allocated foreign exchange, and credit and, 
pursued restrictive trade policy and an inward-looking import-substitution industrial 
strategy (Hope, 1999). 
These interventionist anti-market policies were adopted in the face of the stark 
realities of colossal market failures, poverty, illiteracy and disease and the need for rapid 
economic development to combat these problems. The positive outcomes of these 
policies made Collier and Gunning (1999) remark that in the 1960s Africa's economic 
future looked very prosperous. Despite the positive gains made in the 1960s, these 
interventionist anti-market measures overextended Sub- Saharan African governments in 
the 1970s, and overwhelmed their administrative capacity leading to disappointing 
outcomes such as poverty and social inequality, an external debt burden, a brain drain, 
capital flight, a huge balance of payments disequilibrium, a deteriorated physical 
infrastructure, unemployment and high crime rates. In addition, famine and malnutrition 
became severe, budget deficits expanded, agriculture productivity declined, and there was 
rapid urbanization coupled with scanty urban services such as water, electricity, 
telecommunication and transportation. Besides that, environmental degradation, political 
and civil strife increased, and corruption became pervasive (Hope, 1999; Jaycox, 1992). 
The macroeconomic landscape was the exact replica of the political performance 
of many Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1970s and 80s because there were about 60 
successful coups culminating in forceful change of regimes, 70 abortive coups, and 125 
officially reported coup plots. Ghana represents one extreme case of 5 successful coups, 6 
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abortive coups and 13 formally reported coup plots, to the other extreme are cases like 
Botswana and a few others which experienced no coups at all (McGowan and Johnson, 
1984; Fosu, 2003). Common to these irregular regime changes were abolition of national 
constitutions, a curtailment of political and civil liberties and the establishment of 
unresponsive military dictatorships. Again, these forceful overthrow of governments 
generated political instability and displacement of large segment of the population in 
many Sub-Saharan African countries. The displacement of the population was generally 
accompanied by a loss of jobs and property, thus reducing drastically the marginal 
propensity to save and invest. The political instability induced by military coups could 
further deter investment in fixed capital stocks such as factories, plant and machinery and 
land because investors would prefer to keep their assets in liquid forms such as in gold 
and foreign currencies. Thus in times of political instability the supply of investment 
capital by households and demand of investment funds by businesses would decline 
(Feng, 2002; Alesina and Perrotti, 1996; Alesina et al, 1996). In light of these 
developments, an institution of democratic governance and a large increase in private 
investment are suggested as a prescription for Sub Saharan Africa's dismal economic and 
political performance (World Bank, 1989; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Hope, 1997). 
Private investments are justified on the ground that they respond to market signals which 
implies that society's resources are deployed to sectors that are most needed thus 
ensuring productive and allocative efficiency. Democracy on the other hand promotes the 
rule of law, independent and impartial judiciary, separation of governmental powers and 
checks and balances, periodic and competitive elections, press freedom and peaceful 
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regime change. These factors protect private capital and tend to decrease the appearance 
irregular regime change and political instability. 
Problem Statement 
In order to make the policy environment more friendly and conducive to private 
investment activities, most Sub-Saharan African countries implemented policies such as 
trade liberalization, privatization and financial market liberalization and democratization 
of governance, all being part of a general structural adjustment policies package. 
Appendix 1 gives the chronological list of major economic and political reforms and 
events in Sub-Saharan African countries. According to Pfefferman and Madarassy 
(1989), Sub-Saharan African countries needed to boost private sector investment to 25% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1990s for sustainable growth and development. 
However, private investment performance has fallen short of the estimated 25% and 
remained stagnant between 12.4% and 14.1% from 1993 to 2002. This performance is 
even more disappointing and gloomy if its two giant's economies, Nigeria and South 
Africa are excluded. When only South Africa is excluded private- sector investment 
declined to 11.3% and 13.6% but if both South Africa and Nigeria are removed from the 
computation, the figures dropped to 11.1% and 13.9% between 1993 and 2002 (World 
Bank, 2004). Figure 1 depicts the trend in private investment performance below 
graphically. 
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FIGURE 1 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
PERFORMANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FROM 1993-
2002 
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This dismal performance of private investment deserves even stronger criticism if one 
considers the fact that in Africa, the minimum level of investment required per annum to 
replace the depreciated capital stock is estimated at 13% of GDP (World Bank, 1991; 
Serven and Solimano, 1991). It is imperative to study systematically the forces that 
promote private investment because private sector contributions to economic 
development have taken center stage in policy deliberations in Sub- Saharan Africa, and 
in bilateral and multilateral agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 
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Theoretical framework 
Several economic theories have been developed to explain investment behavior, 
including the accelerator model, the adjustment-cost model, and models based on credit 
rationing. Although each of these models only picks up a little bit of the complex reality 
of aggregate investment behavior, they still form the core of most empirical 
investigations of investment spending. The study of the determinants of private 
investment is further warranted because, as argued by Keynes in his classic work, the 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, fluctuations in private investment 
play a significant role in determining the level of output and unemployment in an 
economy. 
Furthermore, investment spending is a major determinant of long-term economic 
growth. Oshikoya (1994) undertook a pioneering research on the determinants of private 
investment for eight African countries and focused on macroeconomic factors, utilizing 
data from 1970 to 1988. The selection of the eight countries was based on data 
availability rather than on any scientific sampling technique thus affecting the 
generalizability of the results. Besides economic factors, political factors also influenced 
domestic private investment decisions (Serven and Solimano, 1993) but were excluded in 
Oshikoya's empirical work. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of macroeconomic factors 
and democracy (proxied by political rights and civil liberties scores) on gross private 
investment in Sub Saharan Africa from 1993 to 2002. The objective of the study is to test 
neoclassical investment theory which suggests that output, real interest rate, price of 
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capital, rate of depreciation, public sector investment are determinants of private 
investment and other effects such as per capita income, credit availability to the private 
sector, general price level, external shock, real depreciation or devaluation, debt overhang 
and democracy on private investment. The study also controls for the effects of 
geography and war. 
Income per person (per capita income) has been identified as a factor affecting 
private investment because high income countries have the ability to save and investment 
more than low income countries (Greene and Villanueva, 1991). McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973) suggest that in the presence of large financial repression and lack of 
efficient capital markets in developing countries, credit availability could be an important 
factor affecting the level of private investment activity. Again real depreciation or 
devaluation has been postulated as a factor affecting private investment specifically in the 
export sector as devaluation tends to increase the domestic price of exports thus serving 
as an incentive for more private investment (Khan and Knight, 1985; Buffie, 1986). 
Besides, it has been argued that the existence of huge external debt is a disincentive to 
private investment as economic agents construe large external debt stock as a signal of 
high expected tax rates in the future (Borenzstein, 1989; Corden, 1988; Krugman, 1988). 
Pindyck (1991) posits that investment is irreversible and fraught with uncertainties, and 
therefore the inflation rate and the terms of trade may be factors that will affect private 
investment activity as rapid changes in these factors constitute uncertainties to private 
investors. Finally, democracy is postulated to institutionalize the redistributive system, 
and it is also established on a more support base than autocracy, therefore a democratic 
8 
environment is expected to be more conducive to private investment activity than 
autocratic political environment (Feng, 2001). 
Research Questions 
Sub-Saharan African countries implemented market oriented policy reforms in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s to promote private investment activity. In spite of this, private 
investment performance has remained far below the estimated 25% of GDP for 
sustainable development. However, private investment activity takes place in a political 
environment and, as Nyong'o (1997) suggests the top heavy bureaucracies created by 
one-party regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa were generally wasteful, corrupt, inefficient, 
repressive and detrimental to Africa's development. Although private sector initiatives 
and market reforms are essential for sustainable development, they are not sufficient 
conditions because they must go hand-in-hand with democratic governance (World Bank, 
1989; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Therefore in an attempt to examine the factors that 
determine private investment activity in an economy, the research question must 
encompass both macroeconomic and political environment. In view of this assertion, the 
study seeks to answer the following two research questions: 
1. What are the effects of macroeconomic variables on gross private investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa? 
2. What is the influence of democracy as measured by political rights and civil 
liberties scores on gross private investment? 
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Methodology 
Research Design 
The study uses a longitudinal panel of macroeconomic and political data of Sub-
Saharan African countries over 1993 to 2002 to examine the influence of macroeconomic 
and political factors on private investment. Panel design is preferred over cross-section 
and time series design because panel data controls for heterogeneity among individual 
countries (Baltagi, 1995). Cross-section and time series studies do not control for 
heterogeneity thus leading to biased results. However, the use of panel data is not without 
cost. The disadvantage is that it involves annual data covering a short span of time for 
each country. This implies that asymptotic arguments depend largely on the number of 
countries tending to infinity. Increasing the time span will lead to higher costs, an 
upsurge in attrition rates, and increases in the computational difficulty for limited 
dependent variable panel data models (Green, 2000; Baltagi, 1995). 
Data Analysis 
Using quantitative data from African Development Indicators (2004), 
International Financial Statistics (2004) and Freedom House (2003), the study employs 
panel least squares, and fixed and random effects estimation techniques to estimate the 
private investment model. EXCEL, SPSS and EVIEWS computer programs are used to 
compute summary descriptive statistics, correlation and coefficients of the variables. 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study is justified by its important contributions to the 
literature and policy in several ways. First, the inclusion of two political variables, 
political rights and civil liberties as a proxy for democracy in the investment model 
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estimated. Second, an increase in the sample size by including all of the entire 48 Sub-
Saharan African countries in the study. Third, the results of the study have implications 
for country level economic development policy and the impact of monetary, fiscal, 
structural adjustment, and stabilization policies on private investment. Finally, the study 
utilizes the latest annual time series data from 1993 to 2002 using both the fixed effects 
and the random effects estimation techniques to estimate the data. These panel estimation 
techniques capture the cultural, geographic and institutional differences on the estimated 
coefficients of the variables. The time period of the study coincides with major political, 
institutional, and economic reforms in many Sub- Saharan African countries. 
Definition of terms 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the term used to describe those countries of Africa that 
are not part of North Africa. It comprises 48 independent countries sharing similar socio-
cultural and economic features. Appendix 2 gives a list and basic indicators of these 
countries. However, because of missing data Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Namibia, and 
Somalia are not used. 
Investment is defined to mean the flow of output in any given period that is used 
to maintain or increase the capital stock in an economy. The national accounts measure 
three main kinds of physical investment: investment in residential structures, fixed 
business investment, and inventory investment. 
Capital in this context refers to the accumulated stocks of machinery, factories, 
and other durable factors of production. 
Democracy in this research focuses on liberal democracy and it is used 
interchangeably with political freedom. It is defined to mean the degree to which a 
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political system facilitates political liberties and democratic rule. Political liberties exist 
when citizens of a political jurisdiction have the freedom to express different political 
views in any media and enjoy the freedom to establish or belong to any political party or 
group. When the national government of a country is accountable or answerable to its 
citizens and citizens are entitled to participate in the government directly or through their 
elected representatives, democratic rule is said to exist (Bolden 1993, 1990, 1986). 
Democracy or political freedom is operationalized by political rights and civil liberties 
scores according to Freedom House measures. 
Political rights depend on elections being held freely and fairly and 
competitively in democratic countries, and opposition parties play an important role in 
checks and balances. 
Civil liberties are a function of freedom of association, assembly, demonstration, 
speech, and religion, as well as free and independent media and court systems, freedom 
to do business on an equitable basis without excessive government corruption, and 
freedom to organize unions and other private groups (Feng, 2003; Freedom House, 2003, 
1998). The Freedom House Survey rates political and civil liberties separately on a 
seven-point category scale in which 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. The 
average ratings of both scores ranging from 1.0-2.5 are generally considered free, 3.0-5.5 
partly free, and 5.5-7.0 not free. 
Depreciation is an increase in the domestic price of a foreign currency largely by 
market forces. 
Devaluation is an official action undertaken by the central bank to raise the 
domestic price of a foreign currency. 
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External shock refers to unexpected changes in major commodity prices with 
either favorable or adverse consequences. 
Debt overhang refers to the external burden of developing countries that is so 
large that there can be no full repayment without destabilizing the debtor country. 
Creditor banks and governments would end up with less repayment than if they agreed to 
an orderly reduction of the debt through negotiation. 
Limitations 
The findings of the study should be interpreted with caution because the data set 
contains much missing information that was estimated using different methods and 
measures. The regression diagnostic tests show evidence of serial correlation in the data 
which might make the estimated coefficients less significant than they actually are. 
Attempts to correct for serial correlation turn the results in some cases into directions 
contrary to expectations. Again, the study aggregated private investment and assumed 
that the various types of private investment respond in the same way. Future research that 
disaggregates investment into its various components would go a long way to enhance 
our understanding of investment behavior. Despite these limitations, most of the findings 
of the study are consistent with both theoretical and empirical literature. 
Study Overview 
The study will be divided into five main chapters. The first chapter provides an 
introduction and background to the study and introduces the research problem and 
questions. The second part reviews both theory and the empirical literature on investment 
behavior in general. Chapter three details the data sources, model specification, and the 
estimation techniques, and the fourth chapter presents the estimated results of the 
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investment model. The fifth section discuses the results and the implications of the results 
for policy and future research. 
In the next chapter, both the theoretical and empirical literature relating private 
investment to macroeconomics variables and democracy are reviewed in order to show 
the gaps in the political economy literature of private investment that the study attempts 
to fill. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Review 
Generally, the basic theory of investment begins by taking into account the fact 
that investment spending or expenditure is an option to financial saving for allocation 
consumption over time. The implication of this proposition is that for any additional or 
extra investment, the return to investment should be equal to the return on saving. Put 
differently, the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) should be equal to the real rate 
interest adjusted for depreciation (Sachs and Larrain, 1993). However, several empirical 
models such as the accelerator model, the adjustment- cost approach, Tobin's q theory of 
investment, and other theories based on credit rationing have been used to describe and 
estimate the investment function. 
Early empirical investigations of aggregate investment spending by firms noted a 
close association between output and investment spending, and this observation was very 
important to the development of the accelerator model, the earliest theory of investment 
still in empirical use. The accelerator theory of investment, according to Clark, (1917) 
states that investment varies with output and that an increase in the demand for finished 
goods tends to increase investment in inventories more than proportional to increase in 
sales, except when the firm is constrained by: (1) lack of access to additional credit to 
undertake the extra investment, (2) an abnormal increase in supply prices, (3) the anxiety 
that the prosperity is of a temporary nature and (4) the inability of producers to make 
timely deliveries. In quantitative terms, the model assumes that there is a stable 
relationship between the capital stock the firm desires and the firm's level of output. To 
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be more precise, the accelerator theory suggests that the desired amount of capital is a 
constant fraction of output. However, this relationship is postulated rather than proved, so 
in its simplest form the model predicts that investment increases when output accelerates. 
The model has been found to be weak in three respects according to Jorgensen (1967), 
and Hall and Jorgensen (1971). First, the ratio of desired capital to the level of output (h) 
is assumed to be constant and this only holds if the cost of capital is fixed. In reality the 
cost of capital is not fixed because of changes in market interest rates or amendments of 
the laws governing investment. This means that h cannot be fixed because of changes in 
the market interest rates and investment laws. Second, the model assumes that investment 
is always enough to maintain the actual capital stock to be equal to the desired capital 
stock in every period. This assumption is untenable because of the costs of adjusting the 
capital stock and the unavoidable lags in the installation of capital. Third, since future 
output may not be known with certainty, it means that investment must be based on 
expectations of next period's desired level but these expectations may turn out to be 
inaccurate. Despite the limitations of the accelerator model, it actually explains much of 
the variation in investment and in most cases outperforms other more complicated models 
such as the real-business-cycle model and the imperfect information model in explaining 
and predicting investment behavior (Clark, 1979). 
In response to the limitations and restrictive nature of the accelerator theory of 
investment, Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954) formulated the flexible accelerator model. 
The flexible accelerator model focused on the time structure of the investment process 
and the determination of the desired level of capital by long-run considerations. 
Accordingly, changes in the desired capital are transformed into actual expenditure by a 
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geometrically distributed lag structure. In this model capital is adjusted toward its desired 
level by a constant proportion of the difference between desired and actual capital. 
Within the framework provided by the flexible accelerator model, output, internal funds 
and the cost of external finance are main the determinants of investment (Jorgenson, 
1971). However, in the accelerator model of Clark (1917), expectations, profitability, and 
capital costs play no role in investment behavior and given an incremental capital-output 
ratio, it is easy to compute the investment requirements associated with a given target for 
output growth. 
The neoclassical approach to investment was formulated by Jorgensen (1967) and 
Hall and Jorgensen (1971) to overcome the restrictive assumptions of the accelerator 
theory. The neoclassical approach states that the desired capital stock depends on the 
level of output and the user cost of capital which in turn is a function of price of capital, 
the real interest rate and the depreciation rate. The model also recognizes lags in 
decision-making and delivery which in turn result in a gap between actual and the desired 
capital stocks. The investment function within this model is thus an equation for the 
change in the capital stock. However, the assumptions of perfect competition, 
exogenously given output, static expectations about future prices, output and interest 
rates are implausible in the sense that investment is a future facing process that looks 
forward into the future. In addition, the lags in the investment decision-making and 
delivery processes are introduced in the model in an ad hoc manner (Serven and 
Solimano, 1992). 
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Adjustment cost models of Investment 
Early theoretical formulations of the adjustment cost models of investment were 
undertaken by Eisner and Strotz (1963) and Lucas (1967). Essentially, the model posits 
that actual and desired levels of capital are not always equal because firms need a 
reasonable amount of time to estimate and install the desired level of capital. Investment 
proposals are always accompanied by feasibility studies, marketing analyses and 
financial negotiations. Investment decisions take time to implement because they involve 
considerable effort to build new factories, install new machines, and to hire and train 
employees. In addition, the overall cost of investment tends to rise if the firm rushes to 
complete the investment project quickly. Therefore, the objective of profit maximization 
tends to make firms make only gradual changes in the levels of their capital stock. The 
adjustment cost model adds a partial adjustment mechanism into the accelerator model, 
allowing a gradual adjustment of capital to the desired capital stock. The coefficient of 
partial adjustment ranges in value from 0 to 1, and if the coefficient is equal to 1, then we 
have the accelerator model. If it is less than 1, it implies that the actual capital adjusts 
only gradually from the actual to the desired capital stock. Generally, a lower value of the 
coefficient of adjustment indicates a lower speed of adjustment. However, according to 
Clark (1979), the adjustment cost model is an incomplete model because it is very 
difficult to determine the rate at which the actual capital approaches the desired or 
optimal capital stock. 
Tobin's Q Theory 
A related investment theory based on the adjustment cost model is the Tobin q 
Theory. The q theory, Tobin (1967), states that the rate of speed at which the capital 
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stock adjusts to its desired level is related to the ratio of the value of capital to its 
replacement cost. The variable q is defined as the stock market value of the firm divided 
by the replacement cost of the capital of the firm. In this way the stock market value of 
the firm helps to estimate the difference between the actual capital and the desired level 
of capital. The replacement cost of the capital of the firm is the cost that one must bear to 
purchase the plant and equipment of the firm in the open market. Specifically, when q is 
greater than 1, it implies that the desired level of capital is greater than the actual capital 
stock, so investment should be high. Conversely, if q is less than 1, the desired capital is 
less than the actual capital therefore investment must be low. The stock market therefore 
makes available information about the investment incentives facing firms. The q theory 
of investment is very easy to test in developed economies because of the existence of 
efficient capital and financial markets but difficult to test in developing countries due to 
the nonexistence of capital markets and the suppression of financial markets. 
Credit Rationing 
Investment theories based on credit- rationing imply that firms cannot easily 
borrow at market interest rate to finance investment projects. If firms are credit- rationed, 
the rate of investment will not depend only on the market interest rate and the 
profitability of investment, but also on the availability of investment funds, which in turn 
is determined by the cash flow of the firm that wants to undertake the investment. When 
government monetary authorities place interest rate ceilings on lending institutions below 
the market equilibrium interest rate, the available credit is rationed among firms that want 
to undertake investment. McKinnon (1973) documents the serious economic 
inefficiencies that may emanate from credit- rationing caused by governments setting 
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interests rates. The problem associated with the phenomenon of credit- rationing is more 
acute in developing countries especially in Sub- Saharan Africa during the period of state 
control and command of the national economy. Credit- rationing may also arise when 
lenders are unable to assess the risk of lending to a borrower. The important implication 
of credit- rationing is that it constraints firms to finance investment projects, and thus, 
constraining the actual capital stock to adjust to its optimal level as determined by market 
interest rates and the marginal productivity of capital. The theory of credit- rationing 
together with the adjustment cost model explain the gradual movement of the capital 
stock to its desired level. In addition to the formal theories and models of investment, 
several hypotheses had been suggested in the literature to explain investment behavior in 
developing countries. 
Hypotheses of Investment Behavior in Developing Countries 
First, McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), hypothesized that changes in the 
volume of bank credit are directly related to private investment undertakings in 
developing countries. This is because financing through retained earnings and equity is 
totally unavailable in developing countries, and therefore bank credits tend to be the most 
important source of financing for private investment activities in developing countries 
(World Bank, 1990). The positive impact of the availability of bank credits on private 
investment in developing countries has been confirmed by studies undertaken by Blejer 
and Khan (1984), Wai and Wong (1982) and Fry (1980). 
Second, it has been suggested that public sector investment has an impact on 
private investment although the exact effect is ambiguous. Public investment financed by 
domestic borrowing is likely to reduce the amount of credit available for private 
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investment, and the obvious result is a crowding out effect on the private sector (Balassa, 
1988; Feng, 2001). On the other hand, the public investment may enhance private 
investment if public expenditure is directed towards the provision of transportation, 
health, educational and irrigational infrastructure. In this case public and private 
investments are complementary (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; 
Oshikoya, 1994). 
Thirdly, it has been hypothesized that a real devaluation affects private 
investment because, as an expenditure reducing and expenditure switching policy, 
devaluation impacts both domestic demand and, supply and ultimately private 
investment. The increase in the overall price level induced by devaluation reduces 
domestic demand, and, as a result of the slump in economic activity firms are likely to 
reduce investment spending (Khan and Knight, 1985). On the supply-side, since 
devaluation increases the price of exports as measured in domestic currency, investment 
in the export sector will increase while investment activity in the non-export sector will 
be depressed. However, devaluation raises the domestic price of imports, including 
capital and intermediate goods, and therefore devaluation may negatively affect private 
investment as a result of an increase in the real cost of imported capital goods (Buffie, 
1986). 
Fourthly, the irreversible nature of investment has been stressed in the literature. 
Pindyck (1991) argues that a major drawback of current investment models is that they 
overlook the fact that investment expenditures are irreversible, and therefore may be 
delayed. The irreversible nature of investment implies that investment spending 
represents sunk and irrecoverable costs. The ability to delay the implementation of 
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investment projects affords the firm the opportunity to access more information about 
prices, costs and other market factors before deploying its resources. The irreversibility of 
investment means that investment spending by firms is highly sensitive to uncertainties 
about future product prices, interest rates, and the cost and timing of investments in 
general. For macroeconomic policy implications, Pindyck argues that stability and 
credibility are much more important determinants of investment than tax incentives or 
interest rates. Therefore policies that stabilize exchange rates and prices may effectively 
promote private investment. Furthermore, it has been suggested that a large debt 
overhang may inhibit private investment activities (Borenzstein, 1989; Corden, 1988; 
Krugman, 1988). Higher debt service payments will squeeze funds available for 
investment, and developing countries may face credit constraints in the international 
capital markets where there are large debt service payments. Again, the geographical 
location of a country is posited to impact on private investment. Countries located close 
to the sea or navigable rivers benefit from reduced transportation costs for exports, and 
imports. Apart from distance, political barriers could constitute insurmountable obstacles 
to trade even if good relations with neighbors exist (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Finally, 
it has been suggested that civil war may have a negative effect on the stock of physical 
capital, investment and savings. Also, civil war may increase uncertainty, and this is 
likely to reduce the inflow of foreign direct investment, and perhaps promote capital 
flight (Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, 2005). 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Although the focus of this dissertation is on gross private domestic investment, 
this section of the literature review singles out private foreign direct investment because 
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of its important contribution to the development of Sub-Saharan African economies. The 
definition of foreign direct investment can differ depending upon the legal instrument 
being used and whether it is viewed from the home or host country perspective. Capital 
exporting countries favor a broader definition of foreign direct investment in order to 
maintain management and control, while capital importing countries favor a narrower 
definition so that they can retain autonomy over policies specific to the needs of their 
nation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
definitions of foreign direct investment favor management and control of the investment 
by the home country. The World Trade Organization maintains that foreign direct 
investment "occurs when an investor in one country (the home country) acquires an asset 
in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset. The 
management dimension is what distinguishes foreign direct investment from portfolio 
investment in foreign stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments" (1996: 6). The 
International Monetary Fund defines foreign direct investment to as "investment that is 
made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that 
of an investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective choice in the 
management of the enterprise" (1980: 408). The definition of foreign direct investment 
thus shows that the locus of management and control are in the hands of the home 
country. Host nations favor a narrower definition so that they can maintain their 
sovereignty and limit their obligations in international agreements. 
The Two-Gap model has been the theoretical model which illustrates the crucial 
role of foreign direct investment in developing economies (Chenery and Strout, 1966; 
McKinnon, 1964). An extension of the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth, the 
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model postulates that developing countries face a fixed import capacity because of the 
complete inelasticity of export earnings. As a result incremental savings could not be 
transformed into investment because of the difficulty of obtaining the complementary 
imported inputs that are required for domestic investment. Stated differently, the model 
purports to show that developing countries in general are constrained by independent 
savings, and foreign exchange and therefore foreign capital inflows will be required as a 
matter of necessity to overcome the foreign exchange constraint in order to achieve any 
desired or warranted rate of growth for the economy. Foreign capital or investment has 
been shown to be doubly productive according to the "Two- Gap Model" because not 
only does it supplement domestic savings, but even more importantly, it allows the 
foreign exchange bottleneck to be broken. However, Lai (1970), has shown that the 
assumptions required to generate a foreign exchange constraint to growth independent of 
the savings constraint are extremely unrealistic. Hence the "Two-Gap Model" with its 
mechanistic projections of necessary foreign capital requirements, is likely to be 
misleading. It is further argued that the massive debt burden facing most Sub-Saharan 
African countries makes the attraction of long term capital flows critical to help augment 
the total domestic savings required for high growth rate. The attainment of high economic 
growth will ease the debt burden so that funds can be focused on social programs that 
could help sustain development in the long term (Nyikuli, 1999; Trent, 2002). 
The Two-Gap Model and the massive debt burden facing many Sub-Saharan 
African economies suggest that foreign investment could play a positive role in the 
development of these countries, but there is no consensus on the positive impact of 
foreign investment on growth in the literature. In one instance, Walden and Rosenfeld, 
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1990; Chowdhury and Islam, 1993; Rodan, 1997; Gries, 2002; Borensztein et al., 1998 
argue that foreign investment enhances economic growth through the provision of capital, 
technical and marketing expertise. On the other hand Razin et al., 1999 contends that 
foreign investment may have an adverse influence on employment, income distribution, 
and national sovereignty and autonomy. It may also worsen the balance of payments 
position if inputs require importation and profits eventually repatriated. The potential 
negative effects of foreign investment led to nationalization of foreign firms in many 
Sub-Saharan African countries and the adoption of inward-looking import substitution 
policies during early post-independence period. There has been reversal of these policies 
however, through the adoption of structural adjustment policies. Musila et al., 2006 
disaggregated foreign investment into extractive, market seeking and export oriented 
types and suggested that export oriented investment is not likely to cause any divergence 
between private benefits to the investor and social benefits to the host nation. Extractive 
and market seeking types of investment could result in high social costs such as the 
exploitation of economic rents, pollution, and the worsening of income inequality 
through the establishment of dualistic economic structures. 
According to World Investment Report (2006), surging corporate profits 
combined with commodity prices helped boost African FDI inflows in 2005 to a historic 
record of $31 billion from $17 billion the previous year. The composition of FDI in total 
capital formation also increased, to 19% in 2005. Despite this unprecedented 
performance, Africa's share of global FDI remains at about 3%. It is interesting to note 
that a large proportion of the 2005 inflows were concentrated in mining, especially oil 
and gas, thus validating the argument that natural resource availability is a key player in 
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FDI attraction and destination. The report further shows that five countries: South Africa, 
Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco and Sudan received about 66% of the region's inflows. Since 
FDI in Africa is usually concentrated geographically and industrially, this pattern of 
distribution in 2005 is not surprising. The regional distributions of FDI among Africa's 
five sub-regions also showed significant variations. As shown in Figure 2, North Africa 
obtained the lion's share in 2005 accounting for 42% of the total inflows to Africa, 
followed by Southern Africa, which received 23% of African inflows. This sub-region 
experienced the most impressive inflows in terms of growth and sectorial diversity, in 
2005. Inflows rose to $7.1 billion from $1.5 billion in 2004, with investment taking place 
particularly in banking, telecommunications and mining industries. This increase explains 
the sub-regions second highest rankings from the lowest in 2004. West Africa and 
Central Africa are the third largest recipients of African inflows accounting for 15% each. 
As usual Nigeria received 70% of West Africa's inflow thus dominating the region. East 
Africa attracted the least inflows to Africa, obtaining only 5% of the inflows to Africa. 
The region consists of resource poor countries, and majority of which have recently 
experienced political instability. Sub-Saharan Africa received just 58% of the total 
inflows to Africa in 2005, which is quite small relative to its size and population. Figure 2 
shows trends in foreign direst investment performance in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1993 
to 2002. 
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FIGURE 2 
Source: World Investment Report UNCTAD (2006) 
According to Fig 2, the year 1993 recorded the lowest inflow; about 1% of GDP and 
2001 witnessed the highest inflow, 4.5% though not quite impressive. The overall trend 
indicates that foreign direct investment as a proportion of gross domestic investment is 
very small as compared to Latin America and the Caribbean which recorded an average 
of 9.3% over the same period. Sub-Saharan African countries need to attract more FDI in 
order to close the savings gap and break the foreign exchange constraint as suggested by 
the two-gap model. FDI inflows can help African economies to achieve and sustain an 
average GDP growth rate of 7% suggested by the Economic Commission for Africa as 
sufficient to help reduce the percentage of people in poverty by half by 2015. Empirical 
studies have shown that market size, labor costs, openness of the economy, taxes and 
tariffs, political instability, corruption, poor infrastructure and inflation are the key 
determinants of direct investment (Morriset, 2001; Asiedu, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2002). Thus policies and strategies that significantly increase market size, enhances labor 
skill acquisition, minimizes political instability, reduces corruption among public 
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officials to the barest minimum, improves infrastructure and, increases macroeconomic 
stability would at least improve the attractiveness of the investment climate in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
FIGURE 3 
Foreign Direct Investment Performance in Sub-
Sharan Africa from 1993 to 2004 
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Democracy and Investment performance 
There are three schools of thought on the impact of democracy on private 
investment; the compatibility school, the conflict school and the skeptics school 
according to Feng (2003). The compatibility school argues that democracy enhances 
private investment because a lack of government repression and the presence of freedom 
may reduce capital flight resulting in an increase in private capital formation (Kormendi 
and Meguire, 1985; Pastor and Hilt, 1993; Pastor and Sung, 1995; Helliwell, 1994). On 
the other hand the conflict school contends that the authoritarian system of government 
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with a strong political base is more likely to attract private investment than democracy 
especially in developing countries (Gerschenkron, 1992; O'Donnell, 1978; O'Donnell 
and Schmitter, 1986; Root, 1996). The negative impact of democracy on capitalist 
development according to Pastor and Sung (1995) was a major issue for classical 
thinkers. Democracy is generally thought to be a disincentive to investment in two ways. 
First, Huntington and Dominique (1975) suggest that democracy increases the national 
propensity to consume thereby depleting the available resources for savings which is a 
major determinant of investment expenditure. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) expressed 
a similar sentiment that the channel through which democracy impedes economic growth 
is the increased demand for immediate consumption, which reduces the availability of 
capital for investment investment. Second, the median voter theorem suggests that 
democracy allows the median voter to redistribute resources from the capital owner 
towards the poor thus reducing work effort, savings, and investment It is generally 
contended that democracy substitutes the "one dollar one vote" system of the market 
place with "one man one vote" regime of the ballot box. Since the median voter is the one 
that casts the deciding vote in the majoritarian system of governance is not likely an 
owner of capital, the median voter will vote to redistribute wealth in favor of the poor. 
Some economists also echo the concern that the extensive political rights the poor voter 
enjoyed under democracy may create an avenue for capital expropriation (Dornbusch and 
Edwards, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1990; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). The 
disconnection between the "person rights" and "property rights" explains the reason why 
leading democracy such as Britain and the United States initially restricted the franchise 
to property owners. However, Feng (2001) discounted this view and argues that 
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democratic system is generally established on a wider support base and involves 
compromises which to some extent guarantee the efficiency and security of the political 
process more than autocracy. Autocratic regimes generally pose a false semblance of 
government stability but lack legitimacy which is a fundamental requirement for regime 
stability. Besides, political adjustment under a democratic system of government 
minimizes long-term radical political change while the prospect of a peaceful regime 
change under autocracy is doubtful. Private investors caught between the two political 
systems will prefer democracy because democracy institutionalizes the redistribution 
system and reduces income inequality. Therefore democracy promotes a strong middle-
class and reduces the probability of the poor expropriating the assets of the rich (Feng, 
2003; 2001; Pastor and Sung, 1995). Finally, the skeptics school also known as the 
coalition thesis holds that political institutions have no effect on private investment but 
rather domestic coalitions of bankers, government bureaucracies, and labor influence 
private investment. Maxfield (1990), the main exemplar of this school, argues that the 
institutional and organizational capacity of banks leads to particular economic policy 
patterns that have an impact on the integration of financial markets. In the presence of a 
strong connection between bankers and industry and the relationship between the banks 
and the state is dictated by autonomous monetary authorities, the strong connection 
between banks and industry is likely to result in economic policy pattern that favors free 
capital mobility. Therefore when an economy experiences high inflation and high 
taxation there is likely to be a capital flight and a resultant shortage of domestic industrial 
capital. Using Argentina, Brazil and Mexico as examples, Maxfield rejects the view that 
political-regime type has a fundamental impact on capital flight and domestic investment. 
30 
The coalition thesis may not apply to many Sub-Saharan African countries because the 
key assumption of central bank autonomy is nonexistent. 
Empirical Literature 
It is very difficult to organize the empirical literature on the determinants of 
private investment around major themes. However, the empirical literature can be 
broadly classified into two. First those that address only macroeconomic variables and 
policies and second, those that focus on the influence of the political environment on 
private investment activities in addition to macroeconomic issues. With respect to space 
or place, some of the studies focus on developing countries in general or regions for 
instance Africa or Latin America and country specific studies. The commonality among 
these studies is the agreement on the measurement of the dependent variable; private 
investment as the ratio of gross private investment to GDP. The independent variables 
differ among the studies depending upon the model being estimated or the hypothesis 
being tested. The independent variables identified in the literature include the growth rate 
of GDP, per capita income, real exchange rate, credit to the private sector, public 
investment as a percentage of GDP, inflation rate, real interest rate, the debt burden 
measured as the ratio of external debt service payments to the export of goods and 
services and the ratio of the country's stock of external debt to its nominal GDP. The 
political variables are political freedom computed from political rights and civil liberties 
scores (used to operationalize democracy), political instability also constructed from the 
standard deviation of political freedom and policy uncertainty measured by the standard 
deviation of relative political extraction (Feng, 2001). 
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Wai and Wong (1982) explore the determinants of private investment based on a 
modified version of the flexible accelerator theory of investment for five developing 
countries using time series data from 1960 to 1974. The independent variables included 
in the model are private sector output, change in bank credit to the private sector, 
government investment, net capital inflow to the private sector and private capital stock 
The results of the study show that government investment, change in bank credit to the 
private sector and net capital inflow to the private sector are significant in explaining 
private investment in these countries although the relative significance of these variables 
differ across countries. 
Blejer and Khan (1984) examine the influence of macroeconomic policies on 
private investment for 24 developing countries using a least squares dummy variable 
estimation technique (LSDV) over the period 1971 to 1979. The results of the study 
indicate that change in credit to the private sector and change in output exert a significant 
positive impact on private investment. However, the level of public investment shows a 
positive relationship while the change in public investment exerts a negative impact. 
Musalem (1989) estimates time series data for Mexico from 1960 to 1987 and 
finds that private investment is positively related to public investment and real exchange 
rate especially for new capital equipment but negatively related to real interest rate. The 
results confirm the complementarity between private investment and public investment 
and expansionary effect of devaluation on private investment. 
Balassa (1988) estimates cross-sectional data for 21 developed and 94 developing 
countries for the 1973-84 periods and finds that public and private investments are 
negatively related, with an increase in public investment resulting in a decrease in private 
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investment. The estimates further indicate a negative correlation between the share of 
public investment in total investment and the size of the incremental output-capital ratios, 
which shows a lower efficiency of public capital as compared to private capital. 
Serven and Solimano (1991) analyzed the effects of macroeconomic adjustment 
and reform efforts on private investment in 29 developing countries using annual time 
series data from 1970 to 1988. The econometric results show that the real growth of 
output has a significant positive impact on private investment, and public investment has 
a positive effect on private investment after one-year. In addition, the foreign debt-burden 
measured as the ratio of external debt stock to gross domestic product exerts a strong and 
negative impact on private investment. 
Greene and Villanueva (1991) analyzed the effects of macroeconomic variables 
on private investment for 23 developing countries from 1975 to 1987 using pooled time 
series and cross section approach. The results of the study indicate that private investment 
is positively related to real GDP growth, level of per capita GDP, and the rate of public 
sector investment. The real interest rates, domestic inflation, the debt service ratio, and 
the ratio of debt to GDP were found to be negatively related to private investment. 
Faini et al (1990) analyzed the effects of real exchange rate, debt and foreign 
exchange availability on private investment for 83 developing countries using annual data 
from 1978 to 1988. The results of the study indicate that the debt burden and real 
exchange rate have a negative impact on private investment while the availability of 
foreign exchange enhances investment. A further implication of the results is that real 
exchange rate appreciation has a promotional impact on the private investment while 
exchange rate depreciation has a negative impact on private investment. 
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Oshikoya (1994) focuses on the determinants of private investment in Africa 
using data on eight African countries from 1970 to 1988 on combined, and separate 
pooled data for middle, and low income countries. The study implies that increases in real 
output (GDP) have a positive impact on private investment for both group of countries 
although at different significant levels. Public investment appears to be positively related 
to private investment for both groups significantly. This result fails to reject the 
hypothesis that public investment crowds out the private sector. The impacts of real 
exchange rates, domestic inflation rates and change in terms of trade on private 
investment behavior differ between the middle and low income countries in terms of 
magnitude and levels of significance. The real exchange rate has a positive effect on 
investment in middle income countries, but negative, small and insignificant for low 
income countries. Inflation rates have a negative and significant impact on investment for 
low income countries but a positive effect for middle income countries. Changes in the 
terms of trade are weak because of the insignificant negative coefficients. Credit 
availability, debt service ratio and lagged private investment have similar effects on 
private investment in both country groupings. The large or higher significant coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variables suggest that there is a strong inertia in private 
investment in both country groups. The standardized coefficients however suggest that 
the lagged debt service ratio, domestic inflation, public investments and the real exchange 
rate had the most impact on private investment in middle income countries. Credit to the 
private sector, the domestic inflation rate, the GDP growth rate and the debt-service ratio 
had the largest impact on private investment rates in low-income countries. 
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Pastor and Sung (1995) examine the influence of democracy , political and 
operations risk2 ,and worker share of income measured as employee earnings as 
percentage of value added in manufacturing on private investment for 15 developing 
countries from 1973 to 1986. Following Blejer and Khan (1984) and Greene and 
Villanueva (1991), the expected growth rate of GDP, change in credit to the private 
sector, growth rate of public sector investment, inflation rate, coefficient of variation of 
the inflation rate, debt to GDP ratio, and per capita income are introduced into the 
investment model as control variables, and country specific dummies are added to 
capture inter-country differences. The model is estimated using an ordinary least squares-
dummy variable (OLS-DV) approach and, the random effects (RE) regression technique. 
For the OLS-DV results, all the economic control variables are significant except per 
capita income and change in credit to the private sector, which are weakly significant. In 
addition the pro-democracy hypothesis of the study is confirmed. The random effects 
estimation of the full model further reinforced the finding that democracy can indeed 
exert a positive influence on private investment decision making. However, the findings 
of the study should be accepted with caution because only one country from Africa 
(Kenya) was included in the sample, an important control variable, the real exchange rate, 
was also excluded. Finally, there were many missing observations some of which were 
estimated. The consequence was a reduction in the sample size from 30 to 15. Feng 
(2001) on the other hand examined the impact of political freedom, political instability 
and policy uncertainty on private investment for forty developing countries using average 
1
 Pastor and Sung (1995) employed Gurr (1990) measure of democracy which is a composite index derived 
by adding together measures of the competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the executive among others. 
2
 The risk measure is a composite of quantitative assessments of political, economic and policy 
characteristics developed by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence, S.A. (BERI). 
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data from 1978 to 1988. The study used expected growth rate, inflation, variability of 
inflation, primarily school enrollments, and public investment as economic control 
variables. The results of the study indicated that political freedom promotes private 
investment, while political instability and policy uncertainty adversely affect private 
investment. The signs of all economic control variables are consistent with a priori 
expectations except for public investment, which indicates a negative relationship with 
private investment, thus supporting the crowding out hypothesis. 
Summary of empirical literature 
The review of the empirical literature has shown first that, the growth of real 
output exerts a positive impact on private investment. This positive effect has been 
confirmed by studies undertaken by Green and Villanueva (1991), Serven and Solimano 
(1991), Oshikoya (1994), Wai and Wong (1982) and Blejer and Khan (1984). Second, the 
effect of public investment on private investment had been found to be of mixed 
consistency with the theoretical literature. Wai and Wong (1982), Musalem (1989), 
Greene and Villanueva (1991), Blejer and Khan (1984) find a positive impact of public 
investment on private investment while Balassa (1988) and Feng (2001), find a negative 
effect of public investment on private investment. Third, credit availability exerts a 
positive impact on private investment. This has been confirmed by studies undertaken by 
Fry (1981), Blejer and Khan (1994), Wai and Wong (1982) and Oshikoya (1994). 
However, Pastor and Sung (1995) find no significance effect. Fourth, the real interest 
rate has been identified as a factor affecting private investment, and Greene and 
Villanueva (1991) and Musalem (1989) found a negative impact of real interest rate on 
private investment. Fifth, inflation rate as a measure of uncertainty has been found to 
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exert a negative impact on private investment. This negative impact has been confirmed 
by Greene and Villanueva (1991), but Oshikoya (1994) finds a positive effect of inflation 
for a group of middle income African countries. The level of per capita income has been 
found to be a factor affecting private investment positively. Greene and Villanueva 
(1991) find a positive effect while Pastor and Sung (1995) finds only a weakly significant 
positive effect. Furthermore, according to the empirical literature, the real exchange rate 
is a factor affecting private investment. Musalem (1988) finds a positive impact of the 
real exchange rate on new capital equipment for Mexico, while Faini et al (1990) find a 
negative effect for a group of 83 developing countries. Oshikoya (1994) finds a positive 
effect of the real exchange rates for middle income countries, but a negative and 
insignificant effect for low income countries in Africa. Again the external debt burden 
has been found as a determinant of private investment in the empirical literature. Serven 
and Solimano (1991) find a negative impact of the external debt burden on private 
investment for 29 developing countries while Greene and Villanueva (1991), also find a 
similar effect for 23 developed countries. Oshikoya (1994) finds a similar effect for eight 
African countries. In addition, the terms of trade as another indicator of uncertainty 
affects private investment. Oshikoya (1994) finds a negative but insignificant effect for 
the terms of trade on private investment for a group of middle income and low income 
countries in Africa. Finally, for a group of 15 developing countries and 42 developing 
and OECD countries, Pastor and Sung (1995) and Feng (2001) confirmed the positive 
impact of democracy on private investment, albeit using different measures of 
democracy. 
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The review of the literature has shown that private investment is a complex 
phenomenon to explain. This assertion is supported by the ambiguity in the theoretical 
literature especially with respect to the impact of real exchange rate, public investment 
and democracy on private investment. For instance while one strand of the literature 
suggests that public sector investment may impact negatively on private investment 
because of the crowding out effect, another strand implies a positive effect of public 
investment on private investment Furthermore, empirical results are mixed on the impact 
of public investment and real exchange rate on private investment. According to Serven 
and Solimano (1991) a significant drawback of most of the studies that find mixed results 
with respect to the impact of public investment on private is that they failed to consider 
the separate effects of infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, hydroelectric dams, 
and irrigation on private investment. Also, exchange rates are overvalued in most 
developing countries with its distortionary effects on domestic price of inputs and output, 
thereby making it very difficult to capture the true effects of the exchange rate on private 
investment. Again the choice of explanatory variables is not consistent across studies but 
largely depends on the theoretical and hypothetical assumptions of the study in question. 
Besides, the literature has demonstrated that there is dearth of studies on Sub-Saharan 
Africa except for Oshikoya (1994). The study of private investment performance in Sub-
Saharan Africa warrants more examination because the region lags behind other regions 
such as Latin America and Asia in private investment performance (Bouton and 
Sumlinski, 1997). Furthermore, Serven and Solimano (1993: 25) suggest that the 
relationship between political regime and private investment is one of the issues for 
further research, therefore political reforms such as democratization, political, 
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administrative, and fiscal decentralization and civil service reorganization deserve 
empirical analysis. However, no empirical work has been undertaken to examine the 
impact of these reforms, especially the effect of democratization on private investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This study attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature by 
examining the macroeconomic determinants of private investment including the influence 
of democracy, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa from 1993 to 2002 in response to Serven 
and Solimano (1993). In the next chapter the economic model of private investment is 
described and specified and data sources and the limitations of construction of some of 
the variables are stated. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
The study uses panel data to examine the influence of macroeconomic and 
political variables on private investment from 1993 to 2002. The panel design is preferred 
over cross-section and time series designs because panel data controls for heterogeneity 
among individual countries. Cross-section and time series studies do not control for 
heterogeneity thus leading to biased results. Second, panel design provides more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, and more degrees of 
freedom and efficiency while time series and cross-section data are afflicted by 
collinearity. Third, panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment while 
cross-section distributions that appear to be relatively stable mask a multitude of changes. 
Panel data are useful for studying the duration of economic phenomena if the panels are 
long enough. Fourth, panel data identify and measure effects that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series. Finally, panel data allows data to be 
collected on individual countries over time thus reducing the biases resulting from 
aggregation. However, the use of panel data is not without problems. An obvious 
problem is that it involves annual data covering a short span of time for each country. 
Increasing the time span will lead to higher cost, an upsurge in attrition rates and 
increases the computational difficulty for limited dependent variable panel data models 
(Green, 2000; Baltagi, 1995). 
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Economic Model of Investment 
The neoclassical investment theory formulated by Jorgensen (1967) and Hall and 
Jorgensen (1973) despite the limitations of its applicability to developing countries has 
been the starting point for early econometric studies of private investment behavior in 
developing countries (Wai and Wong, 1982; Blejer and Khan, 1984; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991). The neoclassical economic theory of investment suggests that private 
investment rate is a negative function of real interest rate as a measure of user cost of 
capital and a positive function of the growth of real output (GDP) per capita. However, 
the relationship between private investment and growth of real output can readily be 
obtained from the flexible accelerator model where there is a fixed relationship between 
the desired stock of capital and the level of real output. Within the context of developing 
countries, the neoclassical model implies that the rate of public investment is a factor 
affecting private investment even though the exact relationship is ambiguous (Blejer and 
Khan, 1984). In addition to the variables derived from the neoclassical investment theory, 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesized that in less developed countries private 
investment is a positive function of accumulation of real money balances due to limited 
access to credit and equity markets. Therefore one expects a positive relationship 
between private investment and real interest rate contrary to what the neoclassical model 
suggests. 
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Model Specification 
Based on neoclassical investment theory and other hypotheses discussed in the 
literature and following Wai and Wong (1982), Blejer and Khan (1984), Greene and 
Villanueva (1991), Oshikoya (1994) and Feng ( 2001), the private investment function is 
generally specified as follows: 
PIGDpu =fi0+fi1RGDPtt+fi2PCAPll + p,PUIGDPit + J34CCPS„ + p5RIRtl + p6PCCPIit + fi7TOTu + 
PJRERit + fi9EDPEu + 0wLPIGDPh + pnPORITlt + puCILIBit + pnSEADUM + puWDUM + fiu 
The dependent variable is PI GDP, measured as the ratio of gross private investment to 
gross domestic product (GDP). The macroeconomic variables in the model are the 
growth rate of real GDP (RGDP), the per capita income (PCAP), the proportion of 
public investment in gross domestic product (PUIGDP), the change in credit to the 
private sector (CCPS), the real interest rate (RIR), the percentage change in the consumer 
price index (PCCPI), the index of the terms of trade (TOT), the index of real effective 
exchange rate (IRER), the ratio of external debt service payments to export of goods and 
services (EDPE), and the lagged ratio of private investment in gross domestic product. 
The political variables are political rights (PORIT), and civil liberties (CILIB). The 
control variables are availability and presence of seaport (SEADUM) and war (WDUM) 
respectively. The random error term is ju with all the classical assumptions, i, country, t, 
time and the/fc are parameters or coefficients to be estimated. Various versions of the 
general model are estimated and the results presented in Chapter Four. 
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Data 
The study analyzes the effects of macroeconomic and political variables on 
private investment in Sub-Saharan African countries using panel data from 1993 to 2002. 
Data on private investment, the dependent variable measured as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is readily available in the 2004 Edition of the African 
Development Indicators extracted from the World Bank Africa Database. RGDP is the 
growth rate of real GDP suggested by both neoclassical and accelerator theory to exert a 
positive impact on investment. Gross Domestic Product measures the total output of all 
final goods and services produced by residents and nonresidents. Growth rate of gross 
domestic product provides annual growth rates calculated from GDP at constant 1995 
prices. PCAP is real gross product per capita based on the hypothesis that high income 
countries should save more and invest more rapidly than low income countries. Per capita 
GDP is obtained by dividing the final value of all goods and services produced in a 
country by a country's population. It also controls for country size in terms of population 
and level of economic development. PUIGDP is the ratio of public sector investment to 
GDP as a measure of crowding out or crowding in and its exact impact on private 
investment may be negative or positive depending on the quality of investment. 
Change in credit to the private sector (CCPS) is an increase or decrease in credit 
to the private sector in millions of U.S. dollar. In consonance with McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis, its expected sign should be positive. RIR is the real interest rate as a measure 
of user cost of capital suggested by the neoclassical investment theory and in accordance 
with the neoclassical model this should exert a negative influence on private investment. 
However, in this study because of multiplicity of interest rates in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
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the existence of large financial repression real, the real discount rate is employed. The 
real discount rate in each year is the nominal discount rate deflated by the annual change 
in inflation as reflected by the consumer price index (CPI). The two variables capture the 
effects of monetary policy on private investment 
The inflation rate (PCCCPI) is the annual rate of increase in the consumer price 
index. The CPI is the weighted average price of goods and services in the consumption 
basket selected according consumption patterns in the base year. High rates of inflation 
indicate macroeconomic instability which creates uncertainty in the investment climate 
and thus, discouraging private investment. TOT is the index of the terms of trade 
calculated as the ratio of a country's export unit values or prices to its import unit values 
or prices and it captures the impact of external shock on private investment. Unfavorable 
movements in the terms of trade will increase the cost of imports in terms of exports and 
ultimately the worsening of the current account deficits thus inducing macroeconomic 
instability which may negatively affect private investment. According to the expectation 
of the irreversibility theory of investment an increase in the terms of trade should exert a 
positive influence on private investment because adverse movements in the terms of trade 
create uncertainty in the minds of private investors which increases the rewards for 
waiting or delaying investment. 
The index of real effective exchange rate (IRER) is a measure of real 
depreciation or devaluation and it is a combined measure of real exchange rate and 
effective exchange rate. The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for 
relative prices between the countries under consideration while the effective exchange 
rate captures the movement of the exchange rate against a weighted basket of foreign 
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currencies. A real devaluation or depreciation increases the level of foreign prices 
measured in domestic currency and this results in the rise in the price of traded goods 
relative to non-traded goods in the domestic country. Investment in traded goods will 
increase as a result of devaluation whilst investment in non-traded goods will decrease. 
However, if domestic factor prices rise less than proportionately to the domestic currency 
price of final goods, devaluation or depreciation should have a stimulative effect on 
private investment. A decrease in the index indicates real depreciation or devaluation 
whilst a rise in the index shows real appreciation or revaluation. Oshikoya (1994) finds a 
positive and significant impact of real exchange rate for middle income countries in 
Africa but negative and insignificant effect of real exchange rate on private investment 
for low income African countries. 
The ratio of external debt service payments to exports of goods and services or 
the debt service ratio (EDPE) is the measure of the external debt burden. It has been 
postulated that a heavy debt overhang decreases the incentive to invest as private 
investors construe it as a higher expected tax rate on future income and profits. Greene 
and Villanueva, 1991 and Oshikoya, 1994 find a negative and significant effect of large 
external debt on private investment. LRPIGDP is the lagged ratio of private sector 
investment to GDP (lagged dependent variable) as a test for inertia in private investment. 
Democracy is measured as political rights (PORIT) and civil liberties (CILIB) 
scores. They are computed by the Freedom House. Political rights are ranked from 1 to 7; 
1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 representing the lowest degree of 
freedom. The computation is based on national elections being held freely, fairly, and 
competitively in democratic countries, and opposition parties play an important role in 
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checks and balances. The civil liberties score also ranked from 1 to 7; 1 representing the 
highest degree of liberties and 7 representing the lowest degree of liberties. It is based on 
freedom of association, assembly, demonstration, speech, and religion, free and 
independent media and court system and the freedom to do businesses on an equitable 
basis without excessive government corruption, and freedom to organize unions and other 
private groups (Feng, 2001: 277-278; 2003: 44-48). Because both the political rights and 
civil liberties scores are measured in reverse, a negative relationship is expected between 
these variables and private investment. Feng (2001) combined these variables to construct 
political freedom but this dissertation deviates sharply from Feng's empirical work and 
rather follows Ghura and Hadjimichael (1996) by testing the individual effects of these 
variables on private investment. Pastor and Sung (1995) and Feng (2001) find a 
significant and positive impact of democracy on private investment performance in 
developing countries albeit using different measures of democracy. SEADUM is a 
dummy variable to capture the effects of availability and presence of seaport on private 
investment and it adopts a value of zero for landlocked countries and a unit value for 
countries located along the coast. WDUM is also a dummy variable meant to capture the 
effect of wars generally on private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and a country that 
experiences some form of armed conflict on its territory or with its neighbor from 1993 to 
2002 receives a unit value while a country that experiences no armed conflict from 1993 
to 2002 obtains zero. The macroeconomic variables, the percentage change in real GDP, 
the ratio of public-sector investment to GDP, the change in credit to the private sector, 
the percentage change in the consumer price index, the index of the terms of trade, the 
index of real exchange rate, and the ratio of external debt service payments to export of 
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goods and services are extracted from the World Bank Africa Development Indicators 
Database 2004 and 2006 CD-ROM version and International Finance Statistics 
published by the International Monetary Fund. 
Political rights and civil liberties scores, the only two political measures included in the 
model are available in the Freedom House database various issues in time series. The 
variables, symbols, and sources of data are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Variables, Symbols and Sources of Data Collection 
Variable 
Ratio of private investment in 
GDP 
Growth rate of real GDP 
Per capita income 
Public Investment in GDP 
Change in credit to the 
Private sector 
Real interest rate 
Percentage change in the 
Consumer price index 
Index the terms of trade 
Index of real effective 
Exchange rate 
Symbol 
PIGDP 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
Source of Data 
World Bank African Development 
Indicators (ADI) 2004 
African Development Indicators 
African Development Indicators 
African Development Indicators 
ADI (2004) and IFS, IMF 2004 
ADI (2004) and WDI CD-Rom 2006 
WDI (2006) CD-ROM VERSION 
ADI (2004) 
ADI (2004) 
External debt service payment 
to export of goods and services 
Private investment in real GDP 
lagged one year 
Political rights 
Civil liberties 
Seaport 
War 
EDPE WDI (2006) CD-ROM VERSION 
LPIGDP ADI (2004) 
PORIT Freedom House, 2003 
CILIB Freedom House, 2003 
SEADUM 
WDUM 
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Data Description 
The analysis of the data starts with the computation of the mean, the range and the 
standard deviation, (summary statistics) and the association among the variables. Tables 
2 and 3 present the summary statistics and the correlation matrix respectively. The 
summary statistics show that the ratio of private investment to GDP, the dependent 
variable averaged 13.3% but ranges from .4% to 112% with a standard deviation of 5.2% 
from 1993 to 2002. The highest value of 112% was recorded in Equatorial Guinea in 
1996 mainly due to investment in the oil and gas industry. The mean of the growth rate of 
real GDP is 3.6% and varies from a low of -50.2% to a high of 71.2% with a standard 
deviation of 7.4%. Rwanda experienced the lowest negative growth rate in 1994 probably 
due to the outbreak of the civil war, while Equatorial Guinea recorded the highest growth 
rate in 1997 as a result of unprecedented growth in the oil and natural gas sectors. The 
average per capita income is $836.9 and ranges from $60 to $7330 with a standard 
deviation of $1342. Seychelles recorded the highest per capita income in 1997, while 
Democratic Republic of the Congo registered the lowest per capita income in 1997. 
Public investment activity in gross domestic product according to the summary statistics 
varies among Sub-Saharan African countries. Its annual average is 7.4% and ranges from 
-7.8% to 33.1% with standard deviation of 5.2%. The change in credit to the private 
sector shows a positive average of $221.lm, but ranges from -$83.00m to $22,432m with 
standard deviation of $1477.lm. The real interest rate shows a positive mean of 1.79% 
over the study period but varies widely from -131% to 91% with a standard deviation of 
19.51%. The percentage change in the consumer price index shows a wide variation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa from 1993 to 2002. Its mean is 100.63% and ranges from -9.62% in 
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Lesotho in 2001 to 23,773.13 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1994 reflecting 
the economic mismanagement of the Mobutu regime with a standard deviation of 
1181.48. With an average value of 44.1, the terms of trade varies from 44.1 to 1242.0 
with a standard deviation of 59.87. The index of real effective exchange rate has a mean 
of 282.88 with a standard deviation of 3770.9. The debt-service ratio indicates that on 
average Sub-Saharan African countries devote 17.14% of their export earnings to service 
their external debts. However, this figure could be as high as 104.55% and as low as 
4.5% in some cases. Political rights and civil liberties scores show an average 
performance of 4.54 and 4.44 respectively. These imply that on average Sub-Saharan 
African countries are classified as partly free. Seaport and war dummy variables are 0.65 
and 0.21 on the average respectively. According to Table 3, there is a positive association 
among private investment, public investment, and credit to the private sector, real 
effective exchange rate, per capita income, political rights, civil liberties, real growth of 
gross domestic product, seaport, and terms of trade but a negative association with debt-
ratio, inflation, real discount rate, and war. The correlation matrix does not show any 
serious multicollinearity among the independent variables except perhaps between credit 
availability and inflation (0.7) and between political rights and civil liberties (0.87). 
In a preliminary estimation, the study first employs ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation technique to estimate the panel data from 1993 to 2002 for 48 Sub-Saharan 
African countries in order to examine the influence of the various independent variables 
on private investment. Ordinary least squares estimation technique is justified on the 
grounds of the Gauss-Markov Theorem. According to this theorem, in the class of all 
estimators ordinary least squares yield the best linear unbiased estimators (Pindyck and 
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Rubinfield, 1991). Then, fixed and random effects estimation techniques are utilized to 
capture country and time specific effects on the estimated coefficients as panel data lends 
itself easily to estimate these two models. The fixed effects approach takes the intercept 
term to be a group specific constant term in the regression model and that differences 
across units can be captured in the constant term. The random effects approach on the 
other hand specifies that the intercept term is a group specific disturbance similar to the 
error term (Greene, 2002). However, if the intercept term is assumed to be the same 
across all units, then ordinary least squares should yield efficient and consistent 
estimates. The ordinary least squares estimation technique assumes a constant variance of 
the error term (homoscedasticity), independence or an uncorrelated error term (no serial 
correlation), normality and stationarity. However, these assumptions are often times 
violated in time series and cross-sectional data yielding unbiased and consistent but 
inefficient estimates. These violations could render hypothesis tests unreliable and may 
also result in spurious regression with respect to the non-stationarity problem (Pindyck 
and Rubinfield, 1991; Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 2000). 
The results of the panel least squares regressions, and both the fixed and the 
random effects models, are presented in the next chapter. Because of missing 
observations Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Namibia and Somalia are not used, thus the final 
results are based on 43 instead of 48 countries. Time trend and averages are computed to 
obtain some estimates missing data, and Appendix 3 gives a detailed method of how the 
estimated data were obtained or generated. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Ratio of private 13.30 
investment in GDP 
Growth rate of real GDP 3.61 
Per capita income 836.9 
Public Investment in GDP 7.4 
Change in credit to the 22.1 
Private sector 
Real interest rate 1.79 
Percentage change in the 102.63 
Consumer price index 
Index of the terms of trade 100.53 
Index of real effective 282.88 
Exchange rate 
External debt service 17.14 
Payment to export of 
goods and services 
Political rights 4.54 
Civil liberties 4.44 
Seaport 0.65 
War 0.211 
Max Min Std. Dev. 
112.4 0.400 5.212 
71.2 -50.20 7.435 
7330 60.00 1342 
33.1 -7.8 5.2 
22,432 -83.0 1477.1 
91.5 -131.8 19.51 
23773.13 -9.62 1181.48 
1242.0 44.1 59.87 
77622.0 0.00 3770.9 
104.55 0.4514 15.15 
7.0 1.0 1.92 
7.0 2.0 1.37 
1.0 0.0 0.48 
1.0 0.0 0.41 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The purpose of the empirical investigation is to estimate the effects of 
macroeconomic and political factors on gross private investment from 1993 to 2002 using 
panel least squares, fixed and random effects estimation techniques for 43 Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries. Panel least squares results are first presented, followed by the fixed 
effects results and finally the random effect results. Diagnostic results show evidence of 
serial correlation in the data so the study employs the lagged dependent variables 
approach (Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1991; Wooldridge, 2000). The lags of the dependent 
variable are included in the various specifications of the model to correct for serial 
correlation, and the results shows significant improvements in the Durbin Watson (DW) 
statistics. The various specifications of the general investment model estimated include 
the neoclassical-political rights model, neoclassical-civil liberties model, McKinnon-
Shaw-political rights model, McKinnon-Shaw-civil liberties model, macroeconomic-
political rights model, and macroeconomic-civil liberties model. In the neoclassical 
models the emphasis is on the impact of the real interest rate on private investment. The 
McKinnon- Shaw models posit credit availability to the private sector as (measured by 
the change in the dollar amount of credit to the private sector) the main determinant of 
private investment. The macroeconomic-political rights and civil liberties models 
combine both the neoclassical and McKinnon-Shaw models to analyze the joint influence 
of real interest rate and credit availability to the private sector on private investment. The 
dependent variable in all the models is the amount of gross private investment in real 
gross domestic product (PIGDP). The figures in parentheses are standard errors of the 
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parameter estimates; ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated value is significantly 
different from zero in a one tail-test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% error levels, respectively. 
Adjusted R-square and Durbin Watson statistics are reported at the bottom of each table. 
Panel Least Squares 
This section presents the results of the panel least squares regressions and the 
separate effects of geography and wars in general are analyzed in each model. The panel 
least squares estimation technique assumes differences among cross-sectional units can 
be captured in a single constant term. Table 4 presents interesting results of the 
neoclassical-political rights model. First, the coefficient of the growth rate of real 
domestic product (RGDP) is positive and significant at the 5% and 1% levels when 
regressed with sea (SEADUM) and war dummies (WDUM) respectively. The results 
confirm association between output and investment identified in early econometric 
studies. Second, per capita income (PCAP) which is a proxy for stage of economic 
development and the propensity to save and invest is positive according to expectations 
but its level of significance varies in the models. It is significant at the 11% level with the 
sea dummy but significant at the 10% level when the effect of war is controlled for. 
Third, public investment in gross domestic product (PUIGDP) is positively related to 
private investment but insignificant. The results show that an increase in public 
investment may complement private investment. Fourth, the real interest rate (RIR), the 
variable of interest in the neoclassical investment function is negative according to 
expectations. It is significant at the 10% level when analyzed with the influence of war 
but insignificant at conventional levels (10.5%) in the seaport model. Fifth, the 
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Table 4 Neoclassical -Political rights model of private investment: Panel Least 
Squares 
Variables 1 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
SEADUM 
WDUM 
PORIT 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
1.339487 
(1.574089) 
0.100926** 
(0.046853) 
0.000335 
(0.000279) 
0.000279 
(0.073171) 
-0.027790 
(0.022181) 
9.19E-05 
(0.000295) 
-0.005828 
(0.005423) 
0.000689 
(0.001032) 
-0.030753 
(0.024647) 
0.775453*** 
(0.033537) 
0.602649 
(0.725529) 
0.326464** 
(0.203511) 
0.665449 
70.61772 
2.227246 
386 
1.584404 
(1.565349) 
0.102458*** 
(0.046874) 
0.000378* 
(0.000274) 
0.057239 
(0.073212) 
-0.028677* 
(0.022246) 
9.46E-05 
(0.000295) 
-0.005293 
(0.005411) 
0.000725 
(0.001033) 
-0.027394 
(0.025709) 
0.778268** 
(0.033758) 
-0.014808 
(0.987925) 
0.320338** 
(0.216442) 
0.664832 
70.42514 
2.229832 
386 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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coefficient of the percentage change in the consumer price index (PCCPI) is positive 
contrary to expectations but insignificant. Sixth, the terms of trade (TOT) is negatively 
related to private investment contrary to expectations but, its coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Seventh, the real and effective exchange rate (IRER) is positively 
related to private investment but the relationship is not statistically significant. The 
implication is that currency appreciation may have a promotional effect on private 
investment while devaluation or depreciation exerts the opposite effect. Eighth, the 
external debt burden (EDPE) is negatively related to private investment according to 
expectations but the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level only 
in the sea dummy (SEADUM) model. Ninth, the lag of private investment is positive and 
highly significant at the 1% level. Tenth, the availability of seaport (SEADUM) is 
positive but insignificant. Furthermore, the war dummy (WDUM) carries the expected 
negative sign but the estimated coefficient is insignificant. Finally, political rights 
(PORIT) are negative and significant at the 5% and 10 % levels. 
In the neoclassical-civil liberties model, democracy is proxied by civil liberties 
and the individual effects of availability of seaport and war are analyzed in each model 
and the results are summarized in Table 5. First, interestingly, the coefficients of the real 
growth of gross domestic product (RGDP) remain significant at the 5% level. Second, the 
per capita income (PCAP) is positive and significant at the 10% level. Third, public 
investment in gross domestic product (PUIGDP) is positive but insignificant. Fourth, the 
real interest rate (RIR) is negative and is only significant at 13% and 14% levels. Fifth, 
the percentage change in the consumer price index (CCPS) is positive but insignificant. 
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Table 5 Neoclassical -Civil liberties model of private investment: Panel Least 
Squares 
Variables 3 4 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
SEADUM 
WDUM 
CILIB 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
-0.130975 
(1.907281) 
0.099929** 
(0.046746) 
0.000439* 
(0.000289) 
0.078590 
(0.073692) 
-0.024860 
(0.022188) 
0.000109 
(0.000294) 
-0.006024 
(0.005412) 
0.000678 
(0.001029) 
-0.036054* 
(0.024869) 
0.769196*** 
(0.033774) 
0.677733 
(0.725545) 
0.643276** 
(0.306333) 
0.667072 
71.12788 
2.219720 
386 
0.098584 
(1.927873) 
0.101938** 
(0.046768) 
0.000486** 
(0.000286) 
0.074792 
(0.073659) 
-0.026267 
(0.022216) 
0.000113 
(0.000295) 
-0.005303 
(0.005398) 
0.000732 
(0.001030) 
-0.030184 
(0.025676) 
0.771183*** 
(0.034112) 
-0.266403 
(1.001243) 
0.653070** 
(0.330184) 
0.666359 
70.90304 
2.219000 
386 
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Sixth, the index of the terms of trade (TOT) is negative and insignificant. Seventh, the 
real and effective exchange rate (IRER) is positive but insignificant. Eighth, the 
coefficient of the ratio of external debt repayment to export of goods and services 
(EDPE) is negative and significant at the 10% level in sea dummy equation but 
insignificant in the war dummy equation. Ninth, the availability of seaport (SEADUM) 
exerts positive but insignificant effect on private investment. Tenth, the war dummy 
(WDUM) is negative according to expectations but exerts an insignificant impact on 
private investment. Finally, civil liberties scores exert a positive impact on private 
investment and it is significant at the 5% levels. 
A clear consensus has emerged in recent years that, in contrast to developed 
countries one of the principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the 
quantity rather the cost of financial resources. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) are the 
proponents of this argument. Tables 6 and 7 present the empirical results of this model of 
private investment in which the main variable of interest is changed from the real interest 
rate to credit to the private sector. First, in the political rights, sea, and war model, the 
growth rate of real gross domestic product capita income (RGDP) is positive and 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels. Second, the per capita income (PCAP) is positive 
and significant at the 10% level in the war equation. Third, public investment in gross 
domestic product (PUIGDP) is positive but insignificant. Fourth, change in credit to the 
private sector (CCPS), the variable of interest is positive according to expectations but 
statistically insignificant. Fifth, interestingly, the percentage change in the consumer 
price index (CCPS) is negative according to uncertainty and irreversibility of private 
investment hypotheses. Sixth, the index of the terms of trade (TOT) is negative and 
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insignificant. Seventh, the index of real and effective exchange rate is positive and 
insignificant. Eighth, the ratio of external debt repayments to export of goods and 
services (EDPE) is negative and significant at the 10% level in the sea dummy equation. 
Ninth, the coefficient of the lagged private investment (LPIGDP) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Tenth, the availability of seaport (SEADUM) is 
positive but insignificant. Also, political rights (PORIT) are positive and significant at the 
5% and 10% error levels. Furthermore, the effect of war (WDUM) in the political rights 
model is positive but insignificant. Perhaps, a possible explanation is that the threat or 
escalation of wars in general may cause a marginal increase in investment in inventories 
and plant and machinery by private businesses in the military sector in Sub-Saharan 
African countries and this may partially offset the fall of investment in other parts of the 
economy. 
The results of the civil liberties model as summarized in Table 7, first, indicate 
that the real growth of real gross domestic product (RGDP) is significant at the 5% and 
1% levels. Second, the per capita income (PCAP) is positive and significant at the 10% 
and 5% levels. Third, interestingly, public investment in gross domestic product 
(PUIGDP) is positive and its coefficient approaches the 10% significant level. Fourth, the 
coefficient of change in credit to the private sector (CCPS) exerts a positive but 
insignificant impact on private investment. Fifth, the percentage change in consumer 
price index (PCCPS) retains its negative coefficient but insignificant. Fifth, the 
coefficient of the index of the terms of trade is negative but insignificant. Sixth, the real 
and effective exchange rate is positive but insignificant at the 5% level. Seventh, the debt 
service ratio (EDPE) maintains its negative coefficient and significant at the 10% level. 
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Eighth, the lagged of private investment in gross domestic product (LPIGDP) is 
significant at the 1% level. Ninth, the coefficients of seaport (SEADUM) and war dummy 
(WDUM) are positive and negative respectively but insignificant at 5% levels. Finally, 
civil liberties exert a negative impact on private investment and its coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. 
The final version of the panel least squares regression in Table 8 is the 
macroeconomic-political model where the impact of both real interest rate and credit to 
the private sector on private investment are analyzed in addition to other macroeconomic 
variables and democracy. Democracy is proxied by the political rights and civil liberties 
scores, and the results are presented in Table 8. 
First, the results of the macroeconomic-political model of private investment 
suggest that the coefficient of the rate of growth of gross domestic product (RGDP) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, the per capita income 
(PCAP) is positive and significant at the 5% level. Third, public investment in gross 
domestic product (PUIGDP) is positive but insignificant. Fourth, real interest rate (RIR) 
is negative but insignificant. Fifth, the change in credit to the private sector (CCPS) is 
positive but insignificant. Sixth, the coefficient of percentage change in consumer price 
index (PCCPI) is negative but insignificant. Seventh, the index of the terms of trade is 
(TOT) negative but insignificant. Eighth, the real and effective exchange rate (IRER) is 
positive but insignificant. Ninth, the ratio of external debt repayment to export of goods 
and services (EDPE) is negative and significant at the 10% level. The lagged ratio of 
private investment in gross domestic product (LPIGDP) is positive and significant at the 
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Table 6 McKinnon -political rights model of private investment: Panel Least 
Squares 
Variables 5 6 
1.084606 
(1.559614) 
1.354721 
(1.555948) 
RGDP 0.102070** 
(0.047096) 
0.103620** 
(0.047123) 
PCAP 0.000327 
(0.000280) 
0.000373* 
(0.000276) 
PUIGDP 0.067671 
(0.074076) 
0.065418 
(0.074120) 
CCPS 0.000323 
(0.000398) 
0.000328 
(0.000399) 
PCCPI -4.71 E-05 
(0.000438) 
-4.45E-05 
(0.000438) 
TOT -0.004884 
(0.005395) 
-0.004314 
(0.005384) 
IRER 0.001064 
(0.000976) 
0.001112 
(0.000978) 
EDPE -0.035697* 
(0.027865) 
-0.032656 
(0.028804) 
LPIGDP 0.775178*** 
(0.033891) 
0.778572*" 
(0.034097) 
SEADUM 0.642124 
(0.729035) 
WDUM 0.051146 
(0.991869) 
PORIT 0.329397** 
(0.204664) 
0.317271* 
(0.217939) 
Adj R-sq 0.664604 0.663907 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
69.99388 
2.212828 
384 
69.77858 
2.216058 
384 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7 McKinnon -civil liberties model of private investment: Panel Least Squares 
Variables 7 8 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
-0.530991 
(1.866726) 
0.101448** 
(0.046943) 
0.000446* 
(0.000290) 
0.093283* 
(0.074893) 
0.000393 
(0.000398) 
-0.000106 
(0.000437) 
-0.005201 
(0.005381) 
0.000986 
(0.000973) 
-0.309242 
(1.896729) 
0.103579** 
(0.046976) 
0.000497** 
(0.000287) 
0.089732 
(0.074889) 
0.000405 
(0.000399) 
-0.000104 
(0.000438) 
-0.004388 
(0.005367) 
0.001064 
(0.000975) 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
-0.044841** 
(0.028286) 
0.766591*** 
0.034223 
-0.038764* 
(0.028825) 
0.768751*** 
0.034598 
SEADUM 0.717716 
(0.728171) 
WDUM 
CILIB 0.690125** 
(0.690125) 
-0.275270 
(1.007140) 
0.701381** 
(0.332506) 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
0.666790 
70.67508 
2.203884 
0.665987 
70.42383 
2.202310 
N 384 384 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 8 Macroeconomic -political model of private investment: Panel Least Squares 
VARIABLES 10 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
PORIT 
CILIB 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
1.641216 
(1.555338) 
0.103622** 
(0.047033) 
0.000373* 
(0.000275) 
0.062193 
(0.074041) 
-0.025479 
(0.023151) 
0.000202 
0.000414 
-6.25E-05 
(0.000438) 
-0.005177 
(0.005410) 
0.000732 
(0.001034) 
-0.033787* 
(0.027607) 
0.776275*** 
(0.033734) 
0.318589** 
(0.204342) 
0.664995 
70.11517 
2.228862 
384 
0.193532 
(1.876039) 
0.103281** 
(0.046914) 
0.000483** 
(0.000286) 
0.084152 
(0.075027) 
-0.021318 
(0.023195) 
0.000289 
0.000415 
-0.000113 
(0.000438) 
-0.005254 
(0.005397) 
0.000728 
(0.001032) 
-0.041471* 
(0.027982) 
0.769320** 
(0.034027) 
0.639387** 
(0.307628) 
0.666677 
70.63955 
2.217942 
384 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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1% level. Finally, the coefficients of political rights and civil liberties are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. 
The results of the panel least squares indicated that the growth rate of real output, 
per capita income, real interest rate, debt service ratio, past level of private investment in 
gross domestic product, political rights and civil liberties are the significant factors 
affecting private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The adjusted R-Squares which are 
statistically significant at the 1% level indicate that on average the general investment 
model explains about sixty-six percent (66%) of the variation in private investment. 
The Fixed Effects Model 
This section presents the results of the fixed effects model. The fixed effects 
model assumes that differences across cross-sectional units are a country specific term 
which can be captured in the constant term. The estimation is based on macroeconomic 
and political rights-civil liberties model and to prevent the model from being near 
singular, time invariant variables of sea port availability and war are deleted from the 
model. Again, to minimize the problem of exogeneity between amount of private 
investment in gross domestic product and the growth rate of real gross domestic product, 
the effect of growth rate of real gross domestic product is lagged one year. Table 9 shows 
interesting results of the effects of macroeconomic variables and democracy measured as 
political rights and civil liberties scores on private investment. 
The results of the fixed effects model suggest that first, the effect of growth rate 
of real gross domestic product (RGDP) is significant at the 10% level in both models. 
Second, surprisingly and contrary to expectations, per capita income (PCAP) is negative 
and significant at the 5% level. Third, public investment in gross domestic product 
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(PUIGDP) is positive but insignificant at the 5% level. Fourth, real interest rate (RIR) is 
positive but insignificant at the 5% level contrary to expectations of neoclassical 
investment theory but consistent with McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) contended that in the presence of huge financial repression in 
developing countries firms would not equate the marginal product of capital to real 
interest rate hence one should expect a positive relationship between private investment 
and real interest rate. Fifth, the change in credit to the private sector (CCPS) is positive 
according to expectation but its coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. Sixth, the 
percentage change in consumer price index (PCCPI) carries the expected negative sign 
but its coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. Seventh, the index of the terms of 
trade exerts a negative impact on private investment contrary to expectations and its 
coefficient approximates the 10% significant level. Eighth, the index of real and effective 
exchange rate (IRER) is positive but its coefficient is not significant at the 5% level. 
Ninth, the external debt-service burden (EDPE) exerts negative but insignificant impact 
on private investment. Tenth, the effect of private investment after one year is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level indicating a strong inertia in private 
investment. Finally, the impact of political rights (PORIT) and civil liberties (CILIB) are 
negative according to expectations implying that improvement in political rights and civil 
liberties has a promotional effect on private investment albeit not statistically significant 
at the 5% level. 
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The Random Effects Model 
The random effects estimation technique is based on the assumption that cross-
section sample countries are drawn randomly from a much larger population, and thus 
there is no correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. Table 10 
presents the interesting results of the random effect estimation technique. First, the 
random effects results suggest that the effect of the growth rate of real gross domestic 
product (RGDP) on private investment is significant at the 1% level. Second, the level of 
per capita income (PCAP) is positively related to private investment and the estimated 
the coefficients are significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. Third, the effect of 
public investment in gross domestic product (PUIGDP) is positive but insignificant at the 
5% level. This result supports the complementarity between the private and public 
investments hypothesis because public investment in roads, bridges and irrigation dams 
enhances the productivity of private capital. Fourth, the coefficient of the real interest rate 
(RIR) is negative according to expectations of the neoclassical investment theory but its 
effect is not statistically significant at the 5% levels. Fifth, the change in credit to the 
private sector (CCPS) is positive according to expectations but lacks statistical 
significance at the 5% level. Sixth, the percentage change in the consumer price index 
(PCCPI) is negatively related to private investment but insignificant at the 5% level. 
Seventh, the terms of trade exert a negative but insignificant effect on private investment. 
Eighth, the coefficient of real and effective exchange rate (IRER) is positive but 
insignificant at the 5% level. Ninth, the ratio of external debt service repayment to the 
export of goods and services (EDPE) is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9 Macroeconomic -political model of private investment: Fixed Effects 
Method 
VARIABLES 11 12 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
PORIT 
CILIB 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
12.40541 
(3.397219) 
0.080417** 
(0.051405) 
-0.004673** 
(0.002561) 
0.016498 
(0.128931) 
0.033182 
(0.033163) 
0.000554 
(0.000650) 
-0.000370 
(0.000536) 
-0.006804 
(0.005656) 
0.000274 
(0.001082) 
-0.026681 
(0.051212) 
0.489658*** 
(0.051525) 
-0.214106 
(0.422125) 
0.687787 
14.83159 
1.925444 
384 
11.85834 
(4.288392) 
0.079335* 
(0.051467) 
-0.004656** 
(0.002571) 
0.015346 
(0.128962) 
0.031230 
(0.032946) 
0.000540 
(0.000650) 
-0.000364 
(0.000536) 
-0.006769 
(0.005659) 
0.000249 
(0.001083) 
-0.024317 
(0.051007) 
0.490238*** 
(0.051531) 
-0.104197 
(0.705479) 
0.687559 
14.81690 
1.926259 
384 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TablelO Macroeconomic -political model of private investment: Random Effects 
Method 
VARIABLES 13 14 
RGDP 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
LPIGDP 
PORIT 
CILIB 
Adj R-sq 
F-stat 
DW 
N 
1.641216 
(1.499257) 
0.103622*** 
(0.045337) 
0.000373* 
(0.000265) 
0.062193 
(0.071372) 
-0.025479 
(0.022316) 
0.000202 
(0.000399) 
-6.25E-05 
(0.000422) 
-0.005177 
(0.005215) 
0.000732 
(0.000997) 
-0.033787* 
(0.026611) 
0.776275*** 
(0.032518) 
0.318589** 
(0.196974) 
0.664995 
70.11517 
2.228862 
384 
0.193532 
(1.812651) 
0.103281** 
(0.045329) 
0.000483** 
(0.000276) 
0.084152 
(0.072492) 
-0.021318 
(0.022412) 
0.000289 
(0.000401) 
-0.000113 
(0.000423) 
-0.005254 
(0.005215) 
0.000728 
(0.000997) 
-0.041471* 
(0.027037) 
0.769320*** 
0.032878 
0.639387** 
(0.297234) 
0.666677 
70.63955 
2.217942 
384 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Tenth, the coefficients of the political rights and civil liberties are positively related to 
private investment and significant at the 5% level. Finally, the effect of private 
investment after one year is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. 
The Hausman Test 
The analyses so far have shown that the fixed effects and random effects 
estimation techniques have provided different results. Therefore, the inevitable question 
is which should be used? Hausman (1978) provided the correlated random effects test. 
The Hausman Test has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom corresponding 
to the number of explanatory variables. The test excludes the constant term(s) in the 
model. The null hypothesis is that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
regressors in the model. The alternative hypothesis is that the individual effects are 
correlated with the regressors in the model. Therefore, the rejection of the null hypothesis 
implies that the fixed effects should be estimated. Table 11 provides a summary of the 
Hausman Test, the test statistics and the corresponding p-values. 
Table 11: Correlated Random Effects- Hausman Test 
Test Summary 
Cross- section (PORIT) 
Cross-section (CILIB) 
Chi-Sq Statistics 
61.695031 
59.73006 
Chi-sq. d.f. 
11 
11 
Prob. 
0.000 
0.000 
The foregoing has presented the results of the panel least squares, fixed and random 
effects estimation techniques of the private investment model and the Hausman Test. The 
original regression results of all the models can be referenced under Appendix 4. The 
next chapter discusses the results within the context of both theoretical and empirical 
literature, and the policy implications of the results are highlighted. In addition the 
chapter provides limitations of the study, directions for future research and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
An empirical analysis of macroeconomic and political determinants of private 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa demands systematic study because the region lags 
behind the rest of the world in promoting private investment and improving democratic 
governance. This study is grounded in neoclassical investment theory, and investigates 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis and other hypotheses which emphasize the influence of 
macroeconomic, political and geographical factors in explaining private investment 
behavior. The literature review demonstrates a dearth of studies focusing on Sub-
Saharan Africa and little understanding of the determinants of private investment. The 
research problem for the study is the fact that the factors influencing private investment 
promotion in a region implementing structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and political 
reforms are not known. Therefore the study seeks to answer the question: What are the 
macroeconomic and political determinants of private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1993 to 2002? The answers to the research question are indicated in the discussion 
of the findings. 
Data for the study are obtained from the World Bank African Development 
Indicators (ADI) 2004, the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2006 CD-ROM 
Version, the International Financial Statistics, 2004 and Freedom House, 2003. Because 
of missing values, the investment function is estimated only for 43 out of 48 Sub-Saharan 
African countries. The estimation techniques used to estimate the data are panel least 
squares, the fixed effects and random effects methods. 
3
 EXCELL, SPSS, and EVIEWS are the computer software programs employed to analyze the data. 
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Discussions 
Private Investment and Macroeconomic Factors 
First, the study's result indicate that growth rate of real output exerts positive and 
significant impact on private investment in all the estimation techniques. This finding 
supports the accelerator theory of investment and neoclassical investment theory. At the 
empirical level this finding is consistent with Green and Villanueva (1991), Oshikoya 
(1994), Wai and Wong (1982) and Blejer and Khan (1984). 
Second, per capita income as a measure of country size in terms of income and 
population, propensity to save, and the level of economic development is positive and 
significantly related to private investment except in the fixed effects model where it is 
negative and significantly related with private investment. The negative effect contradicts 
Green and Villanueva (1991) and Pastor and Sung (1995). One possible explanation is 
that high income countries tend to consume more and save less, thus drive interest rates 
up which may reduce private investment. 
Third, public investment in gross domestic product exerts a positive but 
insignificant impact on private investment in all the models thus implying that there is 
complementarity between private and public sectors. Public investment in roads, health, 
education, irrigation and hydro electric dams and other infrastructure projects enhances 
the efficiency of private capital although insignificantly. This positive effect is weaker 
than the findings of Wai and Wong (1982), Musalem (1989) and Blejer and Khan (1984). 
Fourth, the impact of the real interest rate on private investment has been found 
to have mixed effects with respect to the estimation techniques. The panel least squares 
and random effects estimation techniques indicate that real interest rate is negatively 
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correlated with private investment according to the expectations of the neoclassical 
investment theory. This finding supports the results of Greene and Villanueva (1991) and 
Musalem (1989). On the other hand the fixed effects estimation technique indicates a 
positive relationship between real interest rate and private investment. A possible 
explanation is that in many Sub-Saharan African countries, bank credits tend to be a 
reliable source of financing private investment. Thus, an increase in real interest rates 
tends to boost savings and eventually private investment because of the positive 
association between savings and private investment. 
Fifth, the study finds that credit availability to the private sector is positively 
related to private investment, although statistically insignificant. At the theoretical level 
this finding is consistent with the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypothesis which 
posits that in the developing countries what matters is the quantity of credit not the cost, 
because firms would not equate the marginal product of capital to real interest rate due to 
financial repression. This finding is consistent with studies undertaken by Fry (1981), 
Blejer and Khan (1994), Wai and Wong (1982) and Oshikoya (1994) all of whom find 
similar and significance impact of bank credit on private investment. Pastor and Sung 
(1995) found a positive but not significant effect for a group of 15 developing countries 
from 1973 to 1986. 
In addition, the results indicate that inflation (the percentage change in the 
consumer price index) as measure of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty exerts a 
positive impact on private investment in the neoclassical investment function but 
negative in the McKinnon-Shaw and the fixed effects and random effects models. The 
estimated coefficients however, do not indicate any significant impact on private 
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investment. This negative impact is consistent with similar finding by Greene and 
Villanueva (1991). Oshikoya (1994) on the other hand found positive effect for a group 
of middle income African countries. The positive association between private investment 
and inflation may explained by the fact that an increase in the price level tend to reduce 
real interest rate, thus the cost of borrowing. This may boost investment as firms may 
borrow at a cheaper cost to expand their plant capacity. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the terms trade as a measure of external 
shock is negatively related to private investment contrary to expectations. A significant 
aspect of the changes in the terms of trade is the resultant income effects because an 
increase in the terms of trade implies that the price of exports has gone up relative to the 
price of imports. With the same amount of physical quantity of exports, the country can 
now import more goods. Therefore, an increase in terms of trade may boost income, 
savings, and private investment. This finding corroborates Oshikoya (1994) which found 
similar negative but insignificant effects for a group of middle and low income African 
countries. 
Again, the real and effective exchange rate is insignificant but positively related 
to private investment in all the estimated models, indicating that currency appreciation or 
revaluation promotes private investment. The study's finding confirms Musalem (1988) 
which found similar positive impact of the exchange rate on new capital import for 
Mexico. It also confirms Oshikoya (1994) which found a positive but insignificant effect 
for middle income African countries. This finding implies that currency devaluations 
undertaken by many Sub-Saharan African countries had no positive impact on private 
investment. 
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Finally, the results of the study indicate that the external debt burden measured as 
the ratio of external debt repayments to export of goods and services is negatively and 
significantly related to private investment. Thus, the finding confirms the debt-overhang 
hypothesis and empirical studies undertaken by Greene and Villanueva (1991) for 23 
developing countries, Serven and Solimano (1991) and Oshikoya (1994). 
Private Investment, Geography and War 
The results of the study indicate that the effect of geography proxied as the 
availability of a seaport is positively correlated with private investment but insignificant. 
This negative correlation between private investment and seaport availability deserves 
public action because forty percent of the Sub-Saharan Africa's population lives in 
landlocked countries with high transportation costs and poor trade facilities (Ndulu, 
2006). The effect of war in general is negative on private investment except in the 
McKinnon-political rights model where the coefficient becomes positive. A possible 
explanation for the positive effect of war on private investment is that the threat or 
escalation of wars in general may cause a marginal increase in investment in inventories 
and plant and machinery by private businesses in the military sector in Sub-Saharan 
African countries and this may partially offset the fall of investment in other parts of the 
economy. 
Private Investment and Democracy 
The effect of democracy proxied by political rights scores and civil liberties 
scores on private investment is mixed with respect to the estimation techniques. 
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Democracy exerts a negative and significant impact on private investment in the panel 
least squares and the random effects estimation techniques thus, supporting the conflict 
school which suggests that extensive political rights and civil liberties may be inimical to 
private capital formation (Gerschenkron, 1992; Root, 1996). The implication of the 
finding is that democratic governance reforms may significantly deter private capital 
formation in Sub-Saharan Africa. This finding is not surprising because the 
institutionalization of democratic governance has led to periodic pre-post election 
violence in many Sub-African countries. On the other hand the fixed effects results 
indicate a positive association between private investment and democracy albeit 
insignificantly. The positive correlation between private investment and democracy is 
consistent with the compatibility school which suggests that democracy promotes private 
investment (Pastor and Sung, 1995; Helliwell, 1994). The positive impact is consistent 
with studies undertaken by Pastor and Sung (1995) for 15 developing countries and Feng 
(2001) for 42 developing countries although using different measures of democracy. 
Pastor and Sung (1995) and Feng (2001), however found significant positive impact of 
democracy on private investment. 
Policy Implications 
The findings of the study have important implications for macroeconomic, 
democratic governance, and country level economic development policies. First growth 
promotes private investment according to the findings of the study. Therefore policies 
that directly enhance growth would promote private investment and economic 
development simultaneously. Second, expansionary fiscal policy that reduces credit to the 
private sector may reduce private investment because of the positive correlation between 
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credit availability and private investment. Similarly, tight monetary policy that restricts 
credit to the private sector and puts an upward pressure on interest rates may have the 
potential of contracting private investment. Third, the findings of the study have 
implications for exchange rate devaluation and the reduction in government deficits 
which are important components of structural adjustment measures. Exchange rate 
devaluations are likely to have adverse repercussions for investment since many Sub-
Saharan African countries rely heavily on imported capital goods. Reduction in 
government deficits that are achieved through cuts in public investment may have 
adverse consequences for private investment because public investment in health, 
education and physical infrastructure is complementary to private investment. Fourth, 
debt reduction strategies should be pursued vigorously to levels that are sustainable since 
private investors construe high external debt levels as a future tax on capital. The present 
levels of debt for many Sub-Saharan African countries cannot be reconciled with the 
present levels of growth, thus discouraging investment, which in turn reduces the ability 
of the government to pay and ultimately adds to the pressures of repayment. Again, 
democratic governance policies should focus on empowering institutions such as the 
electoral commissions and the judiciary to be independent of executive influence and 
manipulation to reduce many pre-post election tension and violence. Finally, for country 
level economic development policy that aims at the attraction of new businesses and the 
retention and the expansion of existing businesses, the policy implication is that public 
investment, the growth of real output and the past level of investment attracts news 
businesses and the expansion of existing ones. 
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Contribution to Theory 
The study has expanded the neoclassical investment function by adding a political 
dimension for Sub-Saharan African countries. The original model focuses on interest 
rates and macroeconomic economic factors as the main drivers of private investment. 
Democracy, the political variable of interest is proxied by political rights scores and civil 
liberties scores. Although democracy's impact on private investment is mixed, the 
research nevertheless provides insights into the political context in which private 
investment takes place. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The first limitation of the study is missing data and this has led to the deletion of 
five countries resulting in a final sample of 43. In some cases missing values are 
forecasted or the means are computed and used in the analysis. Second, the findings with 
respect to democracy in the panel least squares and random effects estimation methods 
should be interpreted with caution because more comprehensive measures of democracy 
are being developed by Kaufmann et al (2005) but the limitations are that they are not 
available in annual time series and only cover a short span of time. Future research could 
explore these measures when they become available in time series. Third, the study 
aggregates private investment and assumes that the various forms of investment respond 
in the same way. Future research that disaggregates investment into its various 
components would go a long way to enhance our understanding of investment behavior. 
Fourth, the study does not account for the effects of taxes and subsidies on private 
investment due to the lack of data. Finally, common to all time series data, regression 
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diagnostics show evidence of serial correlation. Although this has been corrected for 
there is no perfect method for eliminating serial correlation. The presence of serial 
correlation might make the estimated coefficients less significant than they actually are. 
Despite, these limitations, most of the findings of the study are consistent with both the 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
Conclusion 
This study examines macroeconomic and political factors affecting private 
investment in Sub-Saharan African countries from 1993 to 2002. This time period 
witnessed many economic and political events in Africa such as the implementation of 
structural adjustment polices and the introduction of multi-party democracy. The study 
utilized three estimation techniques to analyze the data: panel least squares, fixed effects 
and random effects. The Hausman Test statistics indicates that Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries are not randomly drawn from a larger population of developing countries and 
there is correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. Therefore, the 
greatest weight is placed on the results of fixed effects estimation technique. According 
to the fixed effects estimation results, this study finds that the growth rate of real output, 
real per capita income, and the past levels of private investment are significant factors 
affecting private investment. Public investment, real interest rates, credit to the private 
sector, inflation, terms of trade and real and effective exchange rate are not statistically 
significant in promoting private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy exerts the 
expected positive impact on private investment albeit insignificantly. This implies that in 
Sub-Saharan African countries where elections are held freely and fairly and in 
competitive environment may experience a better private investment performance than in 
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countries that lack basic political rights. Besides, countries that guarantee freedom of 
association, speech, religion, free independence of the media and court system and 
freedom to do business on an equitable basis without excessive government corruption 
would experience superior private investment outcomes. Despite, the statistical 
significance of the fixed effects model, the random effects model has some intuitive 
appeal (Greene, 2000). Therefore, in discussing the findings and the policy implications 
of the study, the results of the random effects model are also taken into consideration. 
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Appendix 1: List of Major Economic and Political events in Sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1990-2002 
Angola 
1991. The government and UNITA conclude a peace agreement 
1992. Elections held and MPLA wins a narrow majority but UNITA refuses to accept the 
results so fighting resumes. 
1993. The UN sponsors peace talks amidst continued fighting. 
1999. It is estimated that there are 1.5 million refugees inside Angola displaced by the 
civil war. 
Benin 
1990. New constitution is adopted, paving the way for political stability. 
1991. Privatization or liquidation of 100 state-owned companies begins under newly 
elected president Nicephore Soglo. 
1994. The CFA franc is devalued by 50 percent, boosting exports and increasing 
inflation. 
1996. Kerekou defeats Soglo in an election to become president again. 
2001. Kerekou wins re-election to the presidency. 
Botswana 
1995. The Botswana Stock Exchange was established. 
1997. The Botswana Export Development Investment Authority is established. 
1998. Festus Mogae is elected president. 
2001. 22 Companies listed on the Stock Exchange, including 6 South African companies. 
Burkina Faso 
1991. A new constitution is adopted by referendum. Campaore is elected president: 
opposition boycotts the election. 
1993. Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) is signed with IMF. 
1994. The CFA franc is devalued. 
1998. Campaore re-elected as president in a contested election. Civil unrest sparks off 
following the assassination of newspaper editor, Norbert Zongo. 
1999. There is a general 1-day strike over privatization, low salaries and assassination of 
Zongo. 
2000. 22 state-owned enterprises are privatized. 
2001. Burkina Fasso suffers severe drought. 
Burundi 
1993. Assassination of democratically elected President Melchoir Ndadaye leads to civil 
war. 
1996. Major Pierre Buyoya becomes president in a military coup. 
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Cameroon 
1993. Opposition political parties are legalized. 
1994. Cameroon's currency, the CFA franc, is devalued by 50 percent. 
1997. The government embarks on a program of structural reform in collaboration with 
the IMF and the World Bank, aimed at increased privatization. 
2000. Work begins on the Chad-Cameroon Oil Production and Pipeline project. 
Cape Verde 
1990. Opposition political groups form the Movement for Democracy (MPD) In April 
and campaign to take part in elections. 
1991. MPD wins the first multi-party election in January with majority in the National 
Assembly and electing Antonio Monteiro as president. 
1992. A new constitution is adopted. 
1996. Monteiro is reelected president. 
2001. Pedro Pires, of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), is 
elected president by a narrow margin of 12 votes. 
Central African Republic 
1993. Ange-Felix Patasse is elected president. 
1996-97. Several army mutinies break out over unpaid salaries and quickly degenerates 
into violence and widespread looting of the capital city of Bangui. Patase flees. 
1997. Bangui accords are signed to reconcile of all political factions; France withdraws 
its troops in October. 
1998. The UN sends a peacekeeping force to help maintain order throughout the 
legislative and presidential elections. 
1999. Patasse is reelected president. 
2001. More mutinies disrupt the political and economic stability of the country. 
Chad 
1990. Iddriss Beby takes power by military force. 
1996. Constitution is voted on by referendum. Presidential elections are held. 
2000. The Chad-Cameroon oil production and pipeline project begins. 
Comoros 
1990. Djoha is elected president. 
1995. Djohar is ousted by a coup. 
1996. Elections conducted and is won by Taki Abdoukarim' National Union for 
Democracy in Comoros (NUDC) but opposition boycotted the elections. 
1997. In August, a secessionist movement headed by Abdallah Ibrahim calls for the 
independence of Anjouan Island. 
1998. In March, over 99 percent of Anjouan citizens vote for independence in a 
referendum. Moheli Island declares independence. Troops are sent to restore order. 
1998. President Taki dies amid rumors of a political assassination. An interim 
government is formed under Tadjine Ben Siad Massoude. 
1999. Colonel Azali Assoumani takes power through a coup and imposes military rule. 
2001. Anew constitution and new national government are established. 
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Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
1990. The United States ends its economic and military support to Mobutu because of 
corruption and human rights abuses. 
1991. Domestic and international pressure mounts and Mobutu agrees to form coalition 
government with UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi. 
1992. The multiparty constitutional conference resumes amid squabbling and continued 
unrest. 
1994. Approximately 500,000 Rwandan ethnic Tutsi's killed by Rwandan ethnic Hutus. 
About 1.3 million Rwandan ethnic Hutus flee into eastern Zaire to escape retribution 
from the new Tutsi government. Among the refugees are Hutus responsible for the 
massacre. 
1996. Revolt in Eastern Zaire because Zairean Tutsi's threatened by Hutus. Uganda and 
Rwanda seize the opportunity to select veteran guerrilla fighter Laurent Kabila to invade 
eastern Zaire. 
1997. Kabila's army, composed mainly of Rwandans and Ugandans, takes Kinshasa and 
Mobutu flees into exile and Kabila appoints himself as the president and changes the 
country's name back to Democratic Republic of Congo. 
1998. Kabila ejects his Rwandan followers which starts a war backed by Rwanda and 
Uganda against him. Rebel activity unofficially divides the Congo into three regions. 
2001. President Laurent Kabila is assassinated and his son Major General Joseph Kabila 
appointed as interim president. 
Congo, Republic of the 
1991. Congo return to multiparty democracy under a new constitution and the country's 
name changed back to the Republic of the Congo. 
1992. Sassou-Nguesso is defeated in the presidential elections by Pascal Lisouba. Later, 
Lissouba is accused of ethnic favoritism and armed factions loyal to Sassou-Nguesso rise 
against him. 
1997. Civil war breaks out in Brazzaville, which results in Brazzaville's destruction. 
Later that year, Sassou-Ngueso overthrows Lissouba with assistance from Angola. 
Cote d'lvoire 
1990. Opposition parties are legalized. Houphouet-Boiney is re-elected under first multi-
party elections. 
1993. Houphouet-Boiney president since independence in 1960 dies and Henry Konan 
Bedie, president of the national assembly succeeds him. 
1994. The CFA franc was devalued in January by 50 percent to prepare the grounds for 
economic reforms and sustained period of economic growth. 
1995. In October, Konan Bedie wins 95 percent of the presidential votes in the face of 
widespread opposition boycott. 
1998. The constitution is amended in August strengthening the powers of the president 
and barring the Quattara from standing in the 2000 presidential election. 
1999. Bedie is ousted in a coup, and a military government under Robert Guei is 
installed. 
2000. Laurent Gbagbo declared himself president after attempt by Robert Guei to 
declared himself the winner. 
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Djibouti 
1991. Civil war with the Afars commences in the North and the rebel group FRUD is 
formed. 
1992. Multiparty elections under new constitution return Ghouled and his PRP party to 
power. 
1994. Peace accord is signed, ending the 3-year uprising by Afar rebels. 
1996. Proposed budget cuts cause a general strike and civil unrest. 
1997. Multiparty elections return FRUD-RPP alliance with Ghouled as president. 
1998. A border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea leads to an increase in trade though 
Djibouti. 
1999. Successor to Ghouled, Ismael Guelleh, wins the presidential elections. 
Equatorial Guinea 
1991. Large oil and natural gas deposits are discovered. 
1994. Investment by Mobil in the oil sector is followed by a large multinationals over the 
next couple of years. 
1996. Multiparty won by Obiang with 98 percent of the vote but the election is widely 
contested as unfair. 
1997. French becomes the second official language and the government claims attempted 
coup in May and doubles the size of the military to 2,000. 
1998. Attacks on government installations in January. 
1999. The ruling party increases its majority in parliament. 
1999. The border dispute with Sao Tome and Principe is settled by negotiation. 
1999. First university established. 
Ethiopia 
1991. Ethnic insurrection, a collapsed economy and the final collapse of the Derg regime. 
The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is democratically voted 
into office. 
1993. Eritrea establishes its independence under a UN-monitored referendum. Ethiopia 
and Eritrea commence a border war that continues to restrain the development of both 
countries. 
Gabon 
1990. After much social unrest, President Bongo introduces multiparty democracy into 
the country. 
1994. Devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 percent 
1998. Bongo is reelected President with 67 percent of the vote. 
Gambia 
1994. A military coup overthrows Jawara. Captian Yahya Jammeh assumes presidency. 
1996. Elections return Yahya Jammeh as president. 
1998. IMF approves 3-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility of US$27 million. 
1999. Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility US$4.5 million loan from IMF is 
approved. 
91 
2000. Gambia receives US$91 million in debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries scheme. 
Ghana 
1990. Mass protest led by the Movement for Freedom and Justice, demands a national 
referendum to establish a multiparty system. 
1992. Draft constitution approved in a referendum which allows political associations to 
exist. In November presidential elections return with 58.3 percent of the vote and the 
December Parliamentary elections return the NDC with 189 out of 200 seats. 
1995. Riots in Accra in February over the introduction of the value added tax (VAT) lead 
to four deaths and the withdrawal of the tax. 
1996. Rawlings wins re-election and the NDC retains a majority in parliament. 
1999. Fall in gold prices upsets Ghana's economic recovery. 
2000. John Agyekum of the New Patriotic Party gains a majority in parliament. 
Guinea 
1991 
Multiparty politics are introduced under a new constitution. 
1996. A group of army officers attempt a military coup but are unsuccessful. 
1998. Conte is re-elected as president. 
Guinea Bissau 
1997. Guinea Bissau joins UEMOA. 
1998. Civil war breaks out after Veira dismisses the army chief. 
1999. Governement of national unity installed and Guinean and Segalese troops who had 
come to the aid of Veira withdraws. 
1999. Veira is ousted. Multiparty elections are held. 
2000. Kumba Iala is elected president. 
Kenya 
1992. The Kenyan government re-introduces multiparty politics. 
2000. Kenya signs a long awaited 3-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
with the IMF and World Bank. 
Lesotho 
1986-97. A period of political unrest, coups, and skirmishes between rebel troops and 
government loyalists. Moshoeshoe II eventually gains power then dies in a car accident. 
1994. Lesotho joins the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
1998. Elections held under alleged cheating and to prevent violence the government 
invites troops from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to help restore order. Heavy 
fighting ensues resulting in 80 percent of shops and businesses damaged severely. 
2000. Government promises to call new elections and privatize more enterprise. 
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Madagascar 
1992. New Constitution enacted; Ratsiraka defeated in elections by Albert Zafy. 
1996. Zafy impeached by parliament; Ratsiraka returns to office. 
1999. Madagascar becomes eligible for U.S. debt relief. 
Mali 
1992. First multiparty elections held. 
1994. In January CFA franc is devalued by 50 percent, raising the prices of imports in 
local currency and reducing import quantity. 
2000. Mali is granted debt-relief under Highly-Indebted Poor Nations program. Railway 
from Bamako to the coast of Dakar re-opens. Dam at central Mali to improve rice 
cultivation is opposed by local and environmental groups. 
Mauritania 
1991. A new constitution is adopted, and opposition parties are legalized. 
1997. President Taya is reelected president in a landslide victory. 
Mauritius 
1991. A coalition MSM and MMM wins elections. 
1992. The constitution is amended to make Mauritius a republic with the British 
Commonwealth. 
2000. Anerood Jugnauth is elected president as head of a coalition between the MSM and 
MMM. 
Mozambique 
1992. A truce between RENAMO and FRELIMO signed after much destruction after 
much destruction and complete dissolution of the economy. FRELIMO became a 
legalized political party and was integrated into a newly created multiparty democratic 
system. 
1992-1999. The World Bank and the IMF fully imposed structural adjustment programs 
emphasizing mass privatization, currency devaluation, foreign investment, and 
stabilization policies. 
Niger 
1991. Multiparty constitution introduced. 
1993. Mahamane Ousmane is elected president. 
1994. CFA franc devalued. 
1996. Col. Mainassara seizes power. 
1999. Mainassara is shot and Major Dauda Wanke becomes president. Wanke steps down 
later and Mamadou Tandja is elected president. 
Nigeria 
1993. Presidential election won by Abiola but annulled by Babanginda (June 23) who 
retires and appoints businessman Shonekan as interim ruler. 
1993. Abacha outs Shonekan (November, 17) and inaugurates a brutal regime. 
1998. Gen Abacha dies and his succesoor inaugurates plans for return to civilian rule. 
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1999. The Third Republic inaugurated with Obansajo as the elected president after 
gubernatorial and local assembly elections. 
Rwanda 
1990. Attack from a rebel group of Tutsi exiles based in Uganda and Cenatral African 
nations and Belgium send troops to help the Habyarimana regime defends itself. 
1991. A new constitution is ratified that states that Rwanda is a multiparty democracy. 
1992. Commodity price shock (coffee) continues. The World Bank imposes more 
privatization with proceeds going to service Rwanda's external debt. 
1992. Ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsi's rise. 
1994. President Habyarimana dies after his plane is shot down and Hutus set out to 
massacre all Tutsi within the country. 
1994. An external rebel group (Rwanda Patriotic Front) takes control of Rwanda and 
forms a transitional government of national unity to oversee return to normalcy. 
1996. The Rwandan government tacitly backs Kabila's efforts to overthrow the 
government of the Congo. 
1996. Huge numbers of refugees who had fled during 1994 return to the country. 
1998. President Kabila expels Rwanda's forces from the Congo and Rwanda in turn 
supports rebel groups in the Congo seeking Kabila's ouster. 
2000. Paul Kagame a Tutsi is elected president of Rwanda in special parliamentary vote, 
but the government is still considered to be in transition. 
Sao Tome and Principe 
1990. A new constitution is approved by referendum by and allows multiparty politics. 
1991. First multiparty elections 
1994. Principe is granted political and administrative autonomy. 
Senegal 
1994. The West African Economic and Monatary Union (UEMOA) is established to 
replace the CEAO. 
1994. The CFA franc, common currency of UEMOA, is devalued by nearly 100 percent. 
2000. Abdoulaye Wade, from the Democratic Party is elected president, making him the 
country's first non-socialist president since the country gained independence in 1960. 
Seychelles 
1991. Return to multiparty political system. 
1993. Third constitution is adopted. 
1995. The Economic Development Act passed in attempt to attract offshore financial 
services; establishment of the Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ). 
1997. Abandonment of the fixed link between the Seychelles rupee and the IMF'S special 
drawing rights (SDR). 
1998. Rene and his supporters win in legislative elections. 
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Sierra Leone 
1991. Massive unemployment and high inflation, coupled with the spillover of the 
Liberian civil war, plunges Sierra Leone into civil strive perpetuated by the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. 
1999. Lome peace accord between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone that 
allows the deployment of over 12,000 UN peacekeeping troops in the country. 
2000. Despite the peace accord, internal fighting continues. 
South Africa 
1990. Following years of mounting black protest and increasing sanctions against South 
Africa because of apartheid, President F.W. De Klerk announces the unconditional 
release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the legalization of the ANC, PAC, and other 
anti-apartheid groups. 
1991. The Group Areas Act, Land Acts, and the Population Registration Act are officially 
rescinded. 
1994. First democratic elections take place under a new constitution. The ANC wins a 
majority in parliament and elects Nelson Mandela as president. 
1996. National Party pulls out of government of national unity and first official census 
occurs in post-apartheid South Africa. 
1999. Second democratic elections held and ANC increases its majority in parliament and 
selects Thabo Mbeki as president. 
Sudan 
1989-99. Umar al-Bashir overthrows al-Mahdi's regime and institutes a dictatorship. 
Sudan supports terrorism and civil war rages in the south and Sudan is practically 
isolated. 
1996. Bashir popularly elected as president. 
2000. Bashir is popularly elected for a second term as president. 
Swaziland 
1992. People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) declares itself an opposition 
party, which is illegal. 
1992. Crackdown on opposition activities and more than 50 opposition activists arrested. 
1996. PUDEMO spearheads campaign of protests and disobedience. 
1997. The trade union calls for strikes nationwide. 
Tanzania 
1995. The first multi-party lections are held, resulting in Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
victory. 
1995. Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is negotiated with the IMF, emphasizing 
rapid privatization of parastatals. 
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Togo 
1991. Pro-democracy pressures mount and Eyadema agrees to transitional government 
leading to free elections. 
1992. Opposition parties launch a general strike, which lasts for 9 months and decimated 
Togo's economy. 
1994. Eyadema wins presidential elections under fraudulent conditions that keep 
opposition parties and voters away. 
1994. Multi-party legislative election are held and won by opposition parties. 
1994. The CFA franc is devalued, leading to a surge in exports in Togo. 
1998. Presidential elections are again boycotted by the opposition and deemed flawed by 
outside observers. 
1999. CFA franc becomes tied to the euro. Legislative elections are won by Eyadema's 
RPT. 
Uganda 
1998. Uganda starts involvement with in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
2000. A flawed national referendum maintains the no-party political system. 
2001. Presidential elections held in March. 
Zambia 
1991. Multi-party elections are won by the Movement for Multi-party Democracy 
(MMD) led by Frederick Chiluba. The MMD embarks on a program of IMF-sponsored 
free market reform. 
1996. The MMD wins a second round of elections. 
2000. Copper mines fully privatized. 
Zimbabwe 
1991. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) is adopted and the 
constitution is amended to deny recourse to the courts in cases of seizure land by the 
government. 
1994. Economic recession leads to widespread industrial unrest. 
1996. Mugabe is returned to the office with 96 percent of the votes with 32 percent voter 
turnout. 
1997. Corruption becomes an issue with allegations of official contracts being unfairly 
awarded and embezzlement of public funds by civil servants and ministers. 
1998. Unprecedented food riots in most of the country's urban centers in response to rises 
in the price of the staple food, maize meal. 
1998. Opposition protests government's decision to send troops to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
2000. Government encourages war veterans to occupy farms, and considerable violence 
erupts. 
2000. Legislative elections are conducted in which the ZANU-PF wins a narrow 
majority. 
Source: Encyclopedia of National Economies 2002 Volume 1 
Appendix 2: Basic Indicators: Size and Growth Rates 
Country 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central Africa Rep 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem.Rep 
Congo, Rep 
Cote d'lvoire 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Population 
(millions) 
2004 
15.5 
8.2 
1.8 
12.8 
7.3 
16.0 
0.5 
4.0 
9.4 
0.6 
55.9 
3.9 
17.9 
0.8 
0.5 
4.2 
70.0 
1.4 
1.5 
21.7 
9.2 
1.5 
33.5 
1.8 
3.2 
18.1 
12.6 
13.1 
3.0 
1.2 
19.4 
2.0 
13.5 
128.7 
8.9 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.2 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
11.4 
0.1 
5.3 
Land area 
thousands 
of sqkm 
1,247 
111 
567 
274 
26 
465 
4 
623 
1,259 
2 
2,267 
342 
318 
23 
28 
101 
1,000 
258 
10 
228 
246 
28 
569 
30 
96 
582 
94 
1,220 
1,025 
2 
784 
823 
1,267 
911 
25 
1 
193 
0 
72 
Average 
annual growth 
(%) 2000-04 
4.6 
1.2 
5.7 
0.3 
0.0 
2.7 
40.0 
0.3 
3.6 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.5 
-2.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.4 
1.3 
0.3 
0.8 
2.4 
1.0 
3.8 
0.3 
1.8 
-2.8 
-1.5 
-0.3 
2.3 
4.0 
2.9 
6.2 
3.2 
0.0 
2.7 
0.3 
2.3 
1.6 
-2.3 
5.3 
Appendix 1 Cont'd 
Basic Indicators: Size and Growth Rates 
Country 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Population 
(millions) 
2004 
8.0 
45.5 
35.5 
1.1 
37.6 
6.0 
27.8 
11.5 
12.9 
Land area 
thousands 
of sqkm 
627 
1,214 
2,376 
17 
884 
54 
197 
743 
387 
Average 
annual growth 
(%) 2000-04 
0.0 
2.2 
7.5 
-0.7 
4.6 
-0.7 
-0.7 
0.3 
-6.2 
Source: Africa Development Indicators, 2006 
Note: Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Namibia, and Somalia are excluded from the study. 
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APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 1 
Neoclassical-civil liberties-seaport model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:57 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 386 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
SEADUM 
CILIB 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
-0.130975 
0.099929 
0.000439 
0.078590 
-0.024860 
0.000109 
-0.006024 
0.000678 
-0.036054 
0.769196 
0.677733 
0.643276 
0.676584 
0.667072 
6.430481 
15465.30 
-1259.980 
2.219720 
Std. Error 
1.907281 
0.046746 
0.000289 
0.073692 
0.022188 
0.000294 
0.005412 
0.001029 
0.024869 
0.033774 
0.725545 
0.306333 
t-Statistic 
-0.068671 
2.137714 
1.518901 
1.066461 
-1.120417 
0.370348 
-1.113065 
0.659229 
-1.449756 
22.77483 
0.934102 
2.099921 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.9453 
0.0332 
0.1296 
0.2869 
0.2633 
0.7113 
0.2664 
0.5102 
0.1480 
0.0000 
0.3509 
0.0364 
13.52720 
11.14470 
6.590570 
6.713550 
71.12788 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 2 
Neoclassical-political rights-war model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:54 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 386 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
WDUM 
PORIT 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
1.584404 
0.102458 
0.000378 
0.057239 
-0.028677 
9.46E-05 
-0.005293 
0.000725 
-0.027394 
0.778268 
-0.014808 
0.320338 
0.674408 
0.664832 
6.452082 
15569.38 
-1261.275 
2.229832 
Std. Error 
1.565349 
0.046874 
0.000274 
0.073212 
0.022246 
0.000295 
0.005411 
0.001033 
0.025709 
0.033758 
0.987925 
0.216442 
t-Statistic 
1.012173 
2.185833 
1.376949 
0.781822 
-1.289106 
0.320110 
-0.978122 
0.702445 
-1.065510 
23.05466 
-0.014989 
1.480019 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.3121 
0.0294 
0.1694 
0.4348 
0.1982 
0.7491 
0.3286 
0.4828 
0.2873 
0.0000 
0.9880 
0.1397 
13.52720 
11.14470 
6.597277 
6.720257 
70.42514 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 3 
Neoclassical-civil liberties-seaport model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:57 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 386 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
SEADUM 
CILIB 
Coefficient 
-0.130975 
0.099929 
0.000439 
0.078590 
-0.024860 
0.000109 
-0.006024 
0.000678 
-0.036054 
0.769196 
0.677733 
0.643276 
Std. Error 
1.907281 
0.046746 
0.000289 
0.073692 
0.022188 
0.000294 
0.005412 
0.001029 
0.024869 
0.033774 
0.725545 
0.306333 
t-Statistic 
-0.068671 
2.137714 
1.518901 
1.066461 
-1.120417 
0.370348 
-1.113065 
0.659229 
-1.449756 
22.77483 
0.934102 
2.099921 
Prob. 
0.9453 
0.0332 
0.1296 
0.2869 
0.2633 
0.7113 
0.2664 
0.5102 
0.1480 
0.0000 
0.3509 
0.0364 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.676584 Mean dependent var 13.52720 
0.667072 S.D. dependentvar 11.14470 
6.430481 Akaike info criterion 6.590570 
15465.30 Schwarz criterion 6.713550 
-1259.980 F-statistic 71.12788 
2.219720 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 4 
Neoclassical-civil liberties-war model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:45 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 386 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
WDUM 
CILIB 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
0.098584 
0.101938 
0.000486 
0.074792 
-0.026267 
0.000113 
-0.005303 
0.000732 
-0.030184 
0.771183 
-0.266403 
0.653070 
0.675891 
0.666359 
6.437368 
15498.45 
-1260.393 
2.219000 
Std. Error 
1.927873 
0.046768 
0.000286 
0.073659 
0.022216 
0.000295 
0.005398 
0.001030 
0.025676 
0.034112 
1.001243 
0.330184 
t-Statistic 
0.051136 
2.179637 
1.699215 
1.015385 
-1.182343 
0.384336 
-0.982357 
0.710252 
-1.175551 
22.60725 
-0.266072 
1.977898 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.9592 
0.0299 
0.0901 
0.3106 
0.2378 
0.7009 
0.3266 
0.4780 
0.2405 
0.0000 
0.7903 
0.0487 
13.52720 
11.14470 
6.592711 
6.715691 
70.90304 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 5 
McKinnon-political rights-seaport model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:31 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
SEADUM 
PORIT 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
1.084606 
0.102070 
0.000327 
0.067671 
0.000323 
-4.71 E-05 
-0.004884 
0.001064 
-0.035697 
0.775178 
0.642124 
0.329397 
0.674237 
0.664604 
6.471075 
15577.43 
-1255.836 
2.212828 
Std. Error 
1.559614 
0.047096 
0.000280 
0.074076 
0.000398 
0.000438 
0.005395 
0.000976 
0.027865 
0.033891 
0.729035 
0.204664 
t-Statistic 
0.695432 
2.167286 
1.166250 
0.913530 
0.810914 
-0.107584 
-0.905196 
1.089804 
-1.281039 
22.87285 
0.880787 
1.609452 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.4872 
0.0308 
0.2443 
0.3616 
0.4179 
0.9144 
0.3659 
0.2765 
0.2010 
0.0000 
0.3790 
0.1084 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.603313 
6.726770 
69.99388 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 6 
McKinnon-political rights-war model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:34 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
WDUM 
PORIT 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
1.354721 
0.103620 
0.000373 
0.065418 
0.000328 
-4.45E-05 
-0.004314 
0.001112 
-0.032656 
0.778572 
0.051146 
0.317271 
0.673559 
0.663907 
6.477796 
15609.80 
-1256.235 
2.216058 
Std. Error 
1.555948 
0.047123 
0.000276 
0.074120 
0.000399 
0.000438 
0.005384 
0.000978 
0.028804 
0.034097 
0.991869 
0.217939 
t-Statistic 
0.870672 
2.198928 
1.351366 
0.882598 
0.822568 
-0.101596 
-0.801177 
1.136649 
-1.133712 
22.83405 
0.051565 
1.455781 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.3845 
0.0285 
0.1774 
0.3780 
0.4113 
0.9191 
0.4235 
0.2564 
0.2576 
0.0000 
0.9589 
0.1463 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.605389 
6.728847 
69.77858 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 7 
McKinnon-civil liberties- seadum model 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:38 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
SEADUM 
CILIB 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
-0.530991 
0.101448 
0.000446 
0.093283 
0.000393 
-0.000106 
-0.005201 
0.000986 
-0.044841 
0.766591 
0.717716 
0.690125 
0.676360 
0.666790 
6.449948 
15475.88 
-1254.580 
2.203884 
Std. Error 
1.866726 
0.046943 
0.000290 
0.074893 
0.000398 
0.000437 
0.005381 
0.000973 
0.028286 
0.034223 
0.728171 
0.307153 
t-Statistic 
-0.284450 
2.161101 
1.541095 
1.245553 
0.989285 
-0.241798 
-0.966447 
1.013315 
-1.585276 
22.39976 
0.985643 
2.246846 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.7762 
0.0313 
0.1241 
0.2137 
0.3232 
0.8091 
0.3344 
0.3116 
0.1138 
0.0000 
0.3249 
0.0252 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.596772 
6.720230 
70.67508 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 8 
MCKINNON CILIB AND WDUM MODEL 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/19/07 Time: 22:40 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
WDUM 
CILIB 
-0.309242 
0.103579 
0.000497 
0.089732 
0.000405 
-0.000104 
-0.004388 
0.001064 
-0.038764 
0.768751 
-0.275270 
0.701381 
1.896729 
0.046976 
0.000287 
0.074889 
0.000399 
0.000438 
0.005367 
0.000975 
0.028825 
0.034598 
1.007140 
0.332506 
-0.163040 
2.204921 
1.733360 
1.198193 
1.015079 
-0.237183 
-0.817589 
1.091710 
-1.344821 
22.21983 
-0.273318 
2.109379 
0.8706 
0.0281 
0.0839 
0.2316 
0.3107 
0.8126 
0.4141 
0.2757 
0.1795 
0.0000 
0.7848 
0.0356 
R-squared 0.675580 Mean dependent var 13.52474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.665987 S.D. dependent var 11.17371 
S.E. of regression 6.457716 Akaike info criterion 6.599180 
Sum squared resid 15513.18 Schwarz criterion 6.722637 
Log likelihood -1255.043 F-statistic 70.42383 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.202310 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 9 
Macroeconomic-political rights model of private investment 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:35 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
PORIT 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
1.641216 
0.103622 
0.000373 
0.062193 
-0.025479 
0.000202 
-6.25E-05 
-0.005177 
0.000732 
-0.033787 
0.776275 
0.318589 
0.674617 
0.664995 
6.467298 
15559.25 
-1255.612 
2.228862 
Std. Error 
1.555338 
0.047033 
0.000275 
0.074041 
0.023151 
0.000414 
0.000438 
0.005410 
0.001034 
0.027607 
0.033734 
0.204342 
t-Statistic 
1.055215 
2.203178 
1.354423 
0.839973 
-1.100589 
0.486832 
-0.142709 
-0.956854 
0.707377 
-1.223880 
23.01148 
1.559093 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.2920 
0.0282 
0.1764 
0.4015 
0.2718 
0.6267 
0.8866 
0.3393 
0.4798 
0.2218 
0.0000 
0.1198 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.602145 
6.725603 
70.11517 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 10 
Macroeconomic-civil liberties model of private investment 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:40 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
CILIB 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient 
0.193532 
0.103281 
0.000483 
0.084152 
-0.021318 
0.000289 
-0.000113 
-0.005254 
0.000728 
-0.041471 
0.769320 
0.639387 
0.676250 
0.666677 
6.451045 
15481.14 
-1254.646 
2.217942 
Std. Error 
1.876039 
0.046914 
0.000286 
0.075027 
0.023195 
0.000415 
0.000438 
0.005397 
0.001032 
0.027982 
0.769320 
0.307628 
t-Statistic 
0.103160 
2.201474 
1.687141 
1.121620 
-0.919070 
0.696219 
-0.258959 
-0.973543 
0.706118 
-1.482044 
22.60894 
2.078441 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Prob. 
0.9179 
0.0283 
0.0924 
0.2627 
0.3587 
0.4867 
0.7958 
0.3309 
0.4806 
0.1392 
0.0000 
0.0384 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.597112 
6.720570 
70.63955 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 11 
Macroeconomic-political rights model of private investment-Fixed effects estimation 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:44 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
PORIT 
Coefficient 
12.40541 
0.080417 
-0.004673 
0.016498 
0.033182 
0.000554 
-0.000370 
-0.006804 
0.000274 
-0.026681 
0.489658 
-0.214106 
Std. Error 
3.397219 
0.051405 
0.002561 
0.128931 
0.033163 
0.000650 
0.000536 
0.005656 
0.001082 
0.051212 
0.051525 
0.422125 
t-Statistic 
3.651636 
1.564383 
-1.825059 
0.127962 
1.000564 
0.852485 
-0.690704 
-1.203005 
0.252822 
-0.520985 
9.503234 
-0.507211 
Prob. 
0.0003 
0.1187 
0.0689 
0.8983 
0.3178 
0.3946 
0.4902 
0.2299 
0.8006 
0.6027 
0.0000 
0.6124 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
variables) 
0.737513 
0.687787 
6.243423 
12551.66 
-1214.370 
1.925444 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.647760 
7.285624 
14.83159 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 12 
Macroeconomic and civil rights model of private investment: Fixed effects 
estimation 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:50 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Variable 
C 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
CILIB 
Coefficient 
11.85834 
0.079335 
-0.004656 
0.015346 
0.031230 
0.000540 
-0.000364 
-0.006769 
0.000249 
-0.024317 
0.490238 
-0.104197 
Std. Error 
4.288392 
0.051467 
0.002571 
0.128962 
0.032946 
0.000650 
0.000536 
0.005659 
0.001083 
0.051007 
0.051531 
0.705479 
t-Statistic 
2.765218 
1.541479 
-1.811299 
0.118993 
0.947898 
0.831191 
-0.680132 
-1.196171 
0.230133 
-0.476744 
9.513406 
-0.147697 
Prob. 
0.0060 
0.1242 
0.0710 
0.9054 
0.3439 
0.4065 
0.4969 
0.2325 
0.8181 
0.6339 
0.0000 
0.8827 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
Period fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
0.737321 
0.687559 
6.245705 
12560.84 
-1214.510 
1.926259 
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
13.52474 
11.17371 
6.648491 
7.286355 
14.81690 
0.000000 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 13 
Macroeconomic-political rights model of private investment: Random effects estimation 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:54 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
PORIT 
1.641216 
0.103622 
0.000373 
0.062193 
-0.025479 
0.000202 
-6.25E-05 
-0.005177 
0.000732 
-0.033787 
0.776275 
0.318589 
1.499257 
0.045337 
0.000265 
0.071372 
0.022316 
0.000399 
0.000422 
0.005215 
0.000997 
0.026611 
0.032518 
0.196974 
1.094686 
2.285589 
1.405086 
0.871392 
-1.141757 
0.505042 
-0.148047 
-0.992646 
0.733836 
-1.269660 
23.87223 
1.617412 
0.2744 
0.0228 
0.1608 
0.3841 
0.2543 
0.6138 
0.8824 
0.3215 
0.4635 
0.2050 
0.0000 
0.1066 
Cross-section random 
Idiosyncratic random 
Effects Specification 
S.D. 
0.000000 
6.234108 
Rho 
0.0000 
1.0000 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.674617 Mean dependent var 13.52474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.664995 S.D. dependent var 11.17371 
S.E. of regression 6.467298 Sum squared resid 15559.25 
F-statistic 70.11517 Durbin-Watson stat 2.228862 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.674617 Mean dependent var 13.52474 
Sum squared resid 15559.25 Durbin-Watson stat 2.228862 
APPENDIX 4: EVIEWS ORIGINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Equation 14 
Macroeconomic-civil liberties model of private investment-Random effects estimation 
Dependent Variable: PIGDP 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 12/28/07 Time: 20:58 
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2002 
Cross-sections included: 43 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384 
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 
RGDP(-1) 
PCAP 
PUIGDP 
RIR 
CCPS 
PCCPI 
TOT 
IRER 
EDPE 
PIGDP(-1) 
CILIB 
0.193532 
0.103281 
0.000483 
0.084152 
-0.021318 
0.000289 
-0.000113 
-0.005254 
0.000728 
-0.041471 
0.769320 
0.639387 
1.812651 
0.045329 
0.000276 
0.072492 
0.022412 
0.000401 
0.000423 
0.005215 
0.000997 
0.027037 
0.032878 
0.297234 
0.106767 
2.278459 
1.746140 
1.160843 
-0.951209 
0.720566 
-0.268015 
-1.007588 
0.730811 
-1.533871 
23.39957 
2.151124 
0.9150 
0.0233 
0.0816 
0.2465 
0.3421 
0.4716 
0.7888 
0.3143 
0.4654 
0.1259 
0.0000 
0.0321 
Cross-section random 
Idiosyncratic random 
Effects Specification 
S.D. 
0.000000 
6.233075 
Rho 
0.0000 
1.0000 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.676250 Mean dependent var 13.52474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.666677 S.D. dependent var 11.17371 
S.E. of regression 6.451045 Sum squared resid 15481.14 
F-statistic 70.63955 Durbin-Watson stat 2.217942 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.676250 Mean dependent var 13.52474 
Sum squared resid 15481.14 Durbin-Watson stat 2.217942 
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